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About the organisations 
Centre for Research on Multinational Corporations (SOMO) 
The Centre for Research on Multinational Corporations (SOMO) is an independent, 
not-for-profit research and network organisation working on social, ecological and 
economic issues related to sustainable development. Since 1973, the organisation 
has been investigating multinational corporations and the consequences of their 
activities for people and the environment around the world. SOMO supports social 
organisations by providing training, coordinating networks and generating and 
disseminating knowledge on multinational corporations in a context of international 
production, trade, financing and regulation.  
 
Clean Clothes Campaign (CCC) 
The Clean Clothes Campaign (CCC) is dedicated to improving working conditions 
and supporting the empowerment of workers in the global garment and sportswear 
industries. Since 1989, the CCC has worked to help ensure that the fundamental 
rights of workers are respected. We educate and mobilise consumers, lobby 
companies and governments, and offer direct solidarity support to workers as they 
fight for their rights and demand better working conditions. The CCC is an 
international alliance that works to improve conditions and support the empowerment 
of workers in the global garment industry. The CCC has national campaigns in 15 
European countries with a network of 250 organisations worldwide, and international 
secretariat based in Amsterdam.  Members and partners include trade unions and 
non-governmental organisations (NGOs) covering a broad spectrum of perspectives 
and interests, such as women’s rights, consumer advocacy and poverty reduction.  
 5 
1. Introduction 
1.1. Background 
This report describes in detail two recent cases of factory fires that swept through the 
facilities of two South Asian clothing manufacturers producing for international 
brands. These cases are exemplary for the poor health and safety conditions of 
thousands of factories in Asia, and the lack of responsibility taken by private and 
public actors throughout the supply chain. The specific factory fires analysed in this 
report have occurred at Ali Enterprises in Karachi, Pakistan, in September 2012; and 
at Tazreen Fashions Limited (hereafter referred to as Tazreen Fashions) in Dhaka, 
Bangladesh, in November 2012. Hundreds of workers were killed in horrendous 
circumstances, and many others were injured. Sub-standard buildings, poor 
emergency procedures, inadequate and blocked fire exits, and overcrowded 
workplaces resulted in an extremely high death toll.
1
  
 
The cases described in this report are not stand-alone incidents, but the result of 
systemic hazardous conditions in the garment industry in Pakistan and Bangladesh. 
The safety record of the Bangladesh garment industry is appalling. Between 2006 
and 2009, 414 garment workers were killed in at least 213 factory fires, as reported 
by the Bangladesh Fire Department.2 Since 2009, at least 165 workers were killed in 
Bangladesh in four separate incidents at factories producing for international brands.3  
Since the Tazreen Fashions fire on 24 November 2012, another 28 factory fires have 
been reported. At least 591 workers were injured and eight workers lost their lives in 
the two months until 28 January 2013.4 According to the International Labor Rights 
Forum (ILRF), in Pakistan at least a dozen garment or shoe factory fires have been 
reported in the media since 2004.5  
 
                                                     
1
 Clean Clothes Campaign, “Hazardous Workplaces: Making the Bangladesh Garment industry safe”, 
November 2012. 
2
 The Star, “Locked doors and lost lives”,  Volume 9 Issue 49, 24 December 2010 
<http://www.thedailystar.net/magazine/2010/12/04/special.htm > 
3
 Garib & Garib Sweater Factory, Gazipur, 25 February 2010; That’s It Sportswear, Dhaka, 14 December 
2010; Eurotex, Dhaka, 3 December 2011 and Tazreen Fashions, Dhaka, 24 November 2012. 
International Labor Rights Forum, “Deadly Secrets – What companies know about dangerous 
workplaces and why exposing the truth can save workers’ lives in Bangladesh and beyond”, 2012. 
4
 American Federation of Labor rand Congress of Industriall Organizations, Petition against access for 
Bangladesh to the GSP, Annex 2: “Garment Factory Fire Incidents since Tazreen Fashion Factory Fire 
of Nov 24, 2012 (as of January 28, 2013).  
5
 International Labor Rights Forum, “Deadly Secrets – What companies know about dangerous 
workplaces and why exposing the truth can save workers’ lives in Bangladesh and beyond”, 2012. 
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The two cases treated in this report are symptoms of an ailing system. They reflect 
systemic flaws on the level of government protection of human rights and lack of 
respect shown by the garment industry for workers’ rights. The garment industries in 
Bangladesh and Pakistan are notorious for their low wages, repression of unions and 
demanding and unsafe working conditions. With regard to fire safety, this means that 
workers are not in the position to monitor or report freely about safety hazards. 
 
However, this is not just a local problem. The Pakistan and Bangladesh garment 
industries are strongly export-oriented; the lion’s share of the production is destined 
for US and European markets. Bangladesh’s garment industry accounts for 78% of 
total exports and contributes 17% of the country’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP). 
Some 59% of Bangladesh exports are destined for the European market, while 26% 
is exported to the United States.6 According to the Pakistan Readymade Garments 
Manufacturers and Exporters Association (PRGMEA), 54% of Pakistan’s exports 
constitute garments, and the garment sector contributes 8.5% to the country’s GDP. 
Around 91% of garments are exported to the European Union (EU) and the US.7  
 
Facing rising wages and higher production costs in China, apparel brands started 
looking for new locations with cheap production capital. Bangladesh and Pakistan 
both fit the bill.
8
 Bangladesh has the lowest hourly wage in the world at USD 0.32 
cents per hour. Pakistan ranks third on labour costs with an average hourly wage of 
USD 0.55 cents.
9
  As a consequence, the volume of orders in Bangladesh and 
Pakistan has exploded, but the production capacity of factory buildings has not been 
adequately adapted to these changing circumstances. In combination with failing or 
absent government inspections and inadequate buyer policies, this creates a ticking 
time bomb and the certainty that many more calamities will occur unless considerable 
investments in building and fire safety in Pakistan and Bangladesh are made. 
1.2. Aim and target group 
In this report, SOMO and CCC aim to clarify the duties and responsibilities of the 
different actors involved in the described cases - buying and supplying companies; 
audit and certification firms; and governments at the beginning and the end of the 
                                                     
6
 Bangladesh Knitwear Manufacturers & Exporters Association and Institute of Apparel Research & 
Technology, “Apparel Exports Statistics of Bangladesh – Fiscal year 2010 – 2011, 2011. 
7
 PRGMEA, “Pakistan – the cotton country”, Presentation on the Garment Industry, 2011  
<http://www.prgmea.org/res.asp> 
8
  Bloomberg Business Week, “Pakistan's Textile Industry Is Dangerously Fragile”, 26 April 2012 
<http://www.businessweek.com/articles/2012-04-26/pakistans-textile-industry-is-dangerously-fragile> 
and World Bank Development Research Group, “The Global Apparel Value Chain, Trade and the crisis 
– Challenges and opportunities for developing countries”, April 2010 
<http://unstats.un.org/unsd/trade/s_geneva2011/refdocs/rds/apparel%20industry%20and%20crisis%20
%28gereffi%20-%20apr%202010%29.pdf> 
9
  USAID, “Cost Competitiveness of Pakistan’s Textiles and Apparel Industry”, September 2009.   
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supply chain. In addition, SOMO and CCC assess to which degree these duties and 
responsibilities have been met. The ultimate objective is to ensure that victims of the 
factory fires receive adequate compensation and redress, and to contribute to 
structural improvements of working conditions in the global garment industry. This 
report is intended for each of the described actor groups, as well as the general 
public.  
1.3. Methodology 
The case descriptions in this report were developed using public sources, and 
primary and secondary sources recorded in an internal database maintained by the 
Clean Clothes Campaign (CCC). The CCC Urgent Appeals database comprises 
information on approximately 380 urgent appeals cases from 1 January, 1999 to date. 
Case files include the background of cases, developments and updates on actions 
undertaken by labour rights organisations in support of the workers concerned, and 
media reports. 
 
A draft of the report was shared for review with the business actors named in this 
report; that is with brands and retailers, both those that have confirmed sourcing from 
the two manufacturers and those that have not, as well as the named audit firms and 
certification bodies. The objective of the review is to allow for the correction of 
possible factual mistakes. 
 
The following companies and organisations responded to the review request: BSCI, 
C&A, Disney, El Corte Ingles, Diesel, Karl Rieker, KiK, Li & Fung, SAI and SAAS, 
Sears, Walmart and WRAP. 
 
Where relevant, their comments have been included in the report.  
The following companies did not respond to the review request: ENYCE, Edinburgh 
Woollen Mills, Delta Apparel, Dickies, Piazza Italia and Teddy Smith.   
1.4. Outline 
There are four chapters following this introduction. Chapter 2 describes the United 
Nations “Protect, Respect, Remedy” framework, which applies to the actors involved 
and is used to assess their duties and responsibilities.  
 
Chapters 3 and 4 present company profiles of Ali Enterprises and Tazreen Fashions, 
including relevant details concerning ownership, location of the facilities, workforce, 
buyers, social auditing and certification. Moreover, detailed accounts of the 
September and November 2012 fires are provided, followed by a description of 
actions undertaken with regards to legal steps and compensation since the disaster 
by relevant actors, including local and international civil society organisations (CSOs). 
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Chapter 5 gives conclusions and summarises the recommendations for each of the 
actors involved – governments, companies and audit firms – in order for them to meet 
their respective duties and responsibilities to protect and respect the rights of the 
victims of the fires and the garment workers in Bangladesh and Pakistan. 
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2. The Protect, Respect and Remedy 
framework 
2.1. Introduction 
The United Nations (UN) has acknowledged that the activities of business enterprises 
may have a negative impact on human rights. A mandate on business and human 
rights was created in 2005 on the issue of human rights and transnational 
corporations and other business enterprises. A Special Representative for Business 
and Human Rights, Professor John Ruggie, was appointed by the UN Secretary 
General. This has resulted in the development of the ‘Protect, Respect and  Remedy’ 
framework in 2008
10
 which outlines the duties and responsibilities for states and 
businesses to address business-related human rights abuses, followed by the 
Guiding Principles adopted in 2011
11
 that outline how states and businesses should 
implement the UN framework.  
 
The ‘Protect, Respect and Remedy’ framework rests on three pillars. The first is the 
State’s duty to protect against human rights abuses by third parties, including 
business enterprises, through appropriate policies, regulation and adjudication. The 
second is the corporate responsibility to respect human rights, which means that 
business enterprises should act with due diligence to avoid infringing on the rights of 
others and to address any adverse impacts. The third is the need for greater access 
by victims to effective remedy, both judicial and non-judicial.12 The following sections 
apply the framework to the actors involved and demonstrate how they failed to 
assume their respective duties and responsibilities in the featured cases. 
2.2. Textile and garment industry in Pakistan 
The textile and garment industry is of vital importance to Pakistan’s economy. 
According to Pakistan's Ministry of Finance's Economic Survey 2011-12, the industry 
                                                     
10
 Report of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on the issue of human rights and 
transnational corporations and other business enterprises, John Ruggie. “Protect, Respect and 
Remedy: a Framework for Business and Human Rights”, 2008 http://daccess-dds-
ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/G08/128/61/PDF/G0812861.pdf?OpenElement  
11
 United Nations Human Rights Office of the High Commissioner, “” Guiding Principles on Business and 
Human Rights. Implementing the United Nations “Protect, Respect and Remedy””, 2011 
http://ww.ohchr.org/Documents/Publications/GuidingPrinciplesBusinessHR_EN.pdf 
12
 SOMO, CEDHA and Cividep India, “How to Use the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human 
Rights in Company Research and Advocacy. A guide for civil society organisations”. Amsterdam: 
SOMO, November 2012 http://somo.nl/publications-en/Publication_3899  
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employs approximately 38 per cent of the country's industrial labour force, constitutes 
46 per cent of its manufacturing base, generates 54 per cent of export earnings and 
accounts for 8.5 per cent of the total gross domestic product.13 The European Union 
and the United States are major export markets. According to the PRGMEA, 91 per 
cent of garments are exported to the EU and the US.14  
 
Pakistan has attracted foreign buyers with low labour costs. This is reflected in the 
poor conditions for garment workers. Trade union rights are often violated in Pakistan; 
employers strongly resist the unionisation of their employees, resorting to intimidation, 
dismissal and blacklisting.15 Workers are faced with unhealthy and hazardous working 
conditions; appropriate protective equipment is lacking; old and outdated wiring 
causes short circuiting, which leads to fire outbreaks; fire extinguishing facilities, if 
available, are often outdated.16  
2.3. Textile and garment industry in Bangladesh 
The garment industry has become the backbone of the Bangladesh economy. It 
accounts for 78 per cent of total exports and contributes 17 per cent of the country’s 
gross domestic product. Some 59 per cent of Bangladesh exports are destined for the 
European market, while 26 per cent is exported to the United States.17 Attracting a 
growing number of foreign buyers over the last years, Bangladesh has become the 
second largest export of apparel, after China.18  
 
Bangladesh’s garment industry is characterised by fast production relying on cheap 
labour and low production costs. Over three million workers, the majority of whom are 
young women, are employed in the Bangladesh garment industry and remain the 
lowest paid garment workers in the world. Many workplaces fail to adhere to the most 
basic standards of health and safety.19 
 
                                                     
13
 Textile World Asia, “Pakistan Faces Challenges”, July/August/September 2012 
<http://www.textileworldasia.com/Articles/2012/September/Country_Profile_Pakistan.html> 
14
 PRGMEA, “Pakistan – the cotton country”, Presentation on the Garment Industry, 
2011,<http://www.prgmea.org/res.asp> 
15
 ITUC, “Annual survey of  violations of trade union rights, 2012 <http://survey.ituc-
csi.org/Pakistan.html?edition=336>  
16
 Daily Times, “Workers decry lack of health and safety in factories, workplaces”, 12 February 2013 
http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=2013\02\12\story_12-2-2013_pg7_13   
17
 Bangladesh Knitwear Manufacturers & Exporters Association and Institute of Apparel Research & 
Technology, “Apparel Exports Statistics of Bangladesh – Fiscal year 2010 – 2011, 2011. 
18
  Based on data from: United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, ‘UNCTAD Handbook of 
Statistics 2011’, United Nations, New York and Geneva, 2011.    
19
 Clean Clothes Campaign, “Hazardous workplaces: Making the Bangladesh Garment industry safe”, 
November 2012 < http://www.cleanclothes.org/resources/ccc/working-conditions/hazardous-
workplaces-making-the-bangladesh-garment-industry-safe >  
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The rapid expansion of the industry has led to the conversion of many buildings, built 
for other purposes, into factories, often without the required permits. Other factories 
have had extra floors added or have increased the workforce and machinery to levels 
beyond the safe capacity of the building. Many factories run day and night in order to 
meet production targets. The establishment of factories, or the conversions of other 
buildings into garment factories, has often been done as quickly and as cheaply as 
possible, resulting in widespread safety problems including faulty electrical circuits, 
unstable buildings, inadequate escape routes and unsafe equipment.20  
2.4. The state duty to protect human rights 
States’ international human rights law obligations require that they respect protect 
and fulfil the human rights of individuals within their territory and/or jurisdiction. This 
includes the duty to protect against human rights abuse by third parties, including 
business enterprises. However, the policies and practices of both the governments of 
Pakistan and Bangladesh have allowed for the permissive environment in which the 
factory fires at Ali Enterprises and Tazreen Fashions could occur, and in which many 
more fires will follow if adequate measures are not taken. 
 
Pakistan 
Pakistan has not ratified all relevant ILO Conventions. For instance, Convention 135 
regarding freedom of association and Convention 155 regarding the right to a safe 
and healthy work environment and Convention 121 on employment injury benefits. 
Moreover, the translation of international labour standards into national labour law is 
not optimal. On the level of enforcement of existing labour law, the Pakistani 
government is clearly failing. The government does not ensure that the rights to 
organise and to bargain collectively are respected.
21
 
 
The legal minimum wage does no equal a living wage. Wages are extremely low; 
after Bangladesh and Cambodia, Pakistani garment workers are the lowest paid 
garment workers in the world.22 
 
Labour inspection is almost non-existent. In fact, labour inspections were abolished 
under the Punjab Industrial Policy of 2003 with the aim of “developing an industry and 
business-friendly environment" to attract foreign investment. The ban originated in the 
province of Punjab and was later also installed in the province of Sindh (where 
                                                     
20
 Ibid.  
21
 ITUC annual survey  of violations of trade union rights 2011: 
<http://survey.ituccsi.org/Pakistan.html?edition=336&lang=en> 
22
 USAID, “Cost Competitiveness of Pakistan’s Textiles and Apparel Industry”, September 2009.   
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Karachi is situated).23 Government bodies in charge of building and fire safety fail to 
carry out their tasks adequately.  
 
Bangladesh 
Bangladesh has not ratified all relevant ILO Conventions. For instance, Convention 
135 regarding freedom of association, Convention 138 regarding the Minimum Age 
for Admission to Employment, Convention 155 regarding the right to a safe and 
healthy work environment, and Convention 121 on employment injury benefits have 
not been ratified. Moreover, the translation of international labour standards into 
national labour law is far from optimal. On the level of enforcement of existing labour 
law, the Bangladesh government fails to carry out its tasks adequately. The 
government does not guarantee that the rights to organise and to bargain collectively 
are respected.
24
  
 
The legal minimum wage does no equal a living wage.  Wages are extremely low; 
Bangladesh garment workers are the lowest paid in the world. 25 Government bodies in 
charge of building and fire safety, such as the inspectorate of Factories and 
Establishments fail to carry out their tasks adequately. While the Bangladeshi 
garment industry has been growing at a rapid pace, the labour inspectorate is 
dramatically understaffed. According to the Bangladesh Occupational Safety, Health 
and Environment Foundation, in 2008 there were only 80 inspectors in the entire 
country—including 20 inspectors for occupational health and safety— for 24,299 
factories, three million shops and establishments, and two major ports.26  According to 
a 2011 International Labour Organization (ILO) report, the number of labour 
inspectors had increased to 93 in 2010. However, the number of new workplaces has 
also dramatically increased during this period. In addition, the ILO noted that the 
number of inspectors devoted to occupational safety and health has remained the 
same over the last 26 years. 27 
2.5. The corporate responsibility to respect human rights 
Within the context of failing protection of workers by the governments of both 
Bangladesh and Pakistan through adequate regulation and inspection, the present 
                                                     
23
 The Guardian, “Karachi's factory fire exposes Pakistan's lax health and safety regime”, 14 September 
2012 http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2012/sep/14/karachi-factory-fire-pakistan-health-safety   
24
 ITUC annual survey  of violations of trade union rights 2011, 
<http://survey.ituccsi.org/Bangladesh.html?edition=336&lang=en> 
25
 Clean Clothes Campaign, “Hazardous workplaces: Making the Bangladesh Garment industry safe”, 
November 2012 <http://www.cleanclothes.org/resources/ccc/working-conditions/hazardous-workplaces-
making-the-bangladesh-garment-industry-safe>  
26
 Ibid.  
27
 International Labor Organization, “Report of the Committee of Experts on the Application of Conventions 
and Recommendations”, 2011, p 504. 
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report unveils how multiple business actors failed to meet their responsibility to 
respect human rights, the combination of which allowed for the tragedies to happen. 
Factory management failed to provide a safe working environment. Buyers (including 
well-known brands and retailers like C&A, KiK and Walmart) failed to ensure that the 
factories they sourced from were safe. And auditing and certification firms that some 
of the buyer firms relied upon failed to provide reliable assurance that the factories 
complied with health and safety standards. In doing so, each of these companies 
along the garment supply chain failed to meet its internationally recognised corporate 
responsibility to respect human rights (which includes labour rights). It is worth noting 
that the corporate responsibility to respect human rights exists independently from the 
state duty to protect human rights. 
 
Due diligence 
An important principle under the corporate responsibility to respect human rights is for 
companies to act with due diligence. Due diligence can be understood as a business 
process through which enterprises actively identify, prevent, mitigate and account for 
how they address and manage their potential and actual adverse human rights 
impacts. The process should include assessing actual and potential impacts 
throughout their business operations, integrating and acting upon the findings, 
tracking responses, and communicating how impacts are addressed. (Potentially) 
affected rights holders, or their legitimate representatives, should be engaged in a 
meaningful manner.  
 
Due diligence implies more than just an assessment of risks for the company; the 
purpose is to understand and address risks and abuses that the company’s activities 
pose to rights holders,  such as factory workers, their dependents and communities, 
including in its supply chain and through its other business relationships. Moreover, 
due diligence demands companies to see to it that future violations of human rights 
are prevented and that adverse impacts are mitigated. Remediation and redress for 
victims of human rights abuses is an important principle under the corporate 
responsibility to respect human rights.
28 
 
 
In the cases of Ali Enterprises and Tazreen Fashions both suppliers and buyers 
heavily relied on auditing and certification to manage their due diligence obligations. 
In both cases, auditing firms and certification bodies provided undeserved and 
unjustifiable assurance that the factories in question complied with health and safety 
standards. Over the past years, the CCC and SOMO have repeatedly pointed out that 
                                                     
28
 United Nations Human Rights Office of the High Commissioner, “Guiding Principles on Business and 
Human Rights. Implementing the United Nations “Protect, Respect and Remedy””, 2011. 
http://ww.ohchr.org/Documents/Publications/GuidingPrinciplesBusinessHR_EN.pdf; SOMO, CEDHA 
and Cividep. How to use the Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights in company research 
and advocacy. November 2012 http://somo.nl/publications-en/Publication_3899  
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‘social audits’ are failing to deliver as a tool for assessing respect for labour rights. 
There are multiple reasons for this.  
 
Workers, workers’ organisations, women's and labour NGOs are marginalised in the 
social audit process. It is easy for workplaces to receive positive evaluations, as audit 
visits are often announced in advance, allowing factory managers time to prepare and 
convey a false impression of working conditions. Factory managers are deceiving 
social auditors in many ways, most notably by coaching workers before they are 
interviewed by auditors to convey false or incomplete information and by falsifying 
records. Social audits are usually too short, too superficial and too sloppy to identify 
certain types of code violations. Workers are badly informed about their rights, often 
too scared for their own jobs to speak up about problems during audits, and generally 
do not have the opportunity to file a complaint.29  
 
The vast majority of social audits are conducted by global firms whose staff is 
generally unskilled and inexperienced to do the job, and whose business model 
conflicts with the requirements for credible, independent social auditing. Social 
auditing is often conducted by means of a checkbox approach. Auditors may only 
look superficially at the availability of firefighting equipment and fire training 
certificates. Auditors often lack the expertise to assess electrical machinery, boilers, 
and construction deficits. Audits are often not followed by effective remediation. Last 
but not least, the audit industry is closed and secretive, preventing serious discussion 
about its policy and practices and possible improvements to its methods.
30
 This report 
describes how social auditing failed as a due diligence tool.  
 
Furthermore, the lack of transparency of audit results inhibits effective preventive 
actions by other actors. When buyer audits detect non-compliances at supplier level, 
the buyer may cut the business relationship without alerting other relevant 
stakeholders. Consequently, worker representatives, the government, and/or other 
buyers cannot take preventive action. Garment factory management may decide not 
to make investments in upgrading buildings to safety standard, since there are 
sufficient buyers out there that are not demanding when it comes to health and safety. 
The lack of transparency of social audit results adds to the risk that unsafe working 
conditions remain unaddressed. Workers remain in current practice uninformed about 
the safety assessment of their factories.  
 
                                                     
29
 Garrett Brown, “The record of failure and fatal flaws of CSR factory monitoring”, February 2013 
http://www.ishn.com/articles/95045-fatal-flaws-of-foreign-factory-audits?v=preview ; Clean Clothes 
Campaign, “Looking for a quick fix. How weak social auditing is keeping workers in sweatshops”, 
November 2005 < http://www.cleanclothes.org/component/content/article/1166 > 
30
 Garrett Brown, “The record of failure and fatal flaws of CSR factory monitoring”, February 2013 
http://www.ishn.com/articles/95045-fatal-flaws-of-foreign-factory-audits?v=preview; Clean Clothes 
Campaign, “Looking for a quick fix. How weak social auditing is keeping workers in sweatshops”, 
November 2005 < http://www.cleanclothes.org/component/content/article/1166 > 
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Even in cases where a buyer cuts their business relationship with an unsafe factory, it 
regularly happens that the same supplier reappears in the supply chain by means of 
(unauthorised) subcontracting as has been the case for Walmart, Sears and Teddy 
Smith production at Tazreen Fashions.   
 
Purchasing practices 
Other major obstacles to ensuring respect for labour rights are the purchasing 
practices that buyers impose on their suppliers. CCC and SOMO are of the opinion 
that purchasing practices should enable and not inhibit suppliers to be decent 
employers. Currently, however, pricing policy does not take into account the social 
and environmental quality of sourced products and does not take into account the 
investment needed for upgrading the building, leaving garment producers with 
insufficient investment capital. To live up to impossibly short supply lead times 
imposed by buyers, suppliers exercise excessive pressure on workers to meet 
production targets, thus violating workers’ rights. Furthermore, buyer-supplier 
relationships in the Ready Made Garment industry are generally unstable: buyers 
shift orders continuously from supplier to supplier, blocking the economic security 
needed for suppliers to make investments in building safety. Instead of building stable 
trading relations with multi-year contracts and placing substantial orders buyers 
generally look for the cheapest options and allow for the expansion of orders even 
when factories are knowingly unsafe, or when it can be reasonably expected that 
higher production volumes will override the capacity of factories, business groups or 
even countries.  
 
The unstable purchasing relationships between buyers and suppliers, particularly at 
subcontracting level, inhibit both prevention of safety hazards and their remedy. First 
of all, suppliers are not motivated to take preventive measures when buyers come 
and go. Second, unstable business relationships make it is more difficult for buyers to 
use their leverage to ensure safe buildings and safe practices. Third, once an incident 
occurs, the factory may be producing for a limited amount of buyers, while many more 
have “profited” from unsafe (and cheap) production conditions. In fact, the most 
common answer for buyers when confronted with the presence of their garment 
products in burned down factories is that the subcontracting was unauthorised or that 
it concerns samples. This limits their liability, both in legal and non-legal terms.  
 
Redress 
Preventive measures taken by business actors along the supply chain in these two 
cases were clearly inadequate, but even after the tragic events occurred, companies 
failed to ensure swift and adequate redress for the victims of the fire and their 
families. Remediation and redress for victims of human rights abuses is another 
important principle under the corporate responsibility to respect human rights. Civil 
society groups in Bangladesh and Pakistan, with the support of  CCC, global union 
IndustriALL and others, have developed clear proposals for the involved 
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governments, companies and audit firms in order for them to meet their respective 
duties and responsibilities to respect the rights of the victims of the fires and the 
garment workers in Bangladesh and Pakistan. These proposals include details 
regarding compensation and redress. Persistent advocacy by local CSOs, CCC and 
others has resulted in a number of brands and retailers taking steps in the right 
direction. After months of campaigning pressure, KiK finally agreed to discuss 
compensation with local labour rights group PILER. This resulted in an agreement 
between KiK and PILER signed on 5 January 2013. However, still many demands 
have not been met to date, as the cases will demonstrate. 
 
Compensation 
ILO convention 121 recommends institutionalised compensation schemes.31 However, 
Bangladesh and Pakistan have not ratified Convention 121. Full compensation may 
not automatically be ensured by law and practice. Nevertheless, the highest 
international labour standard should prevail. According to SOMO and CCC full 
compensation should include compensation for grief and loss of income, medical and 
psychological care, payment of wages (and in case a factory closes, negotiated 
severance) and continuance of worker employment, for the families of the victims, the 
injured, and workers who are now jobless. 
 
Many of the workers and families affected by the garment fires in both Karachi and 
Dhaka have not yet received any compensation or have only received compensation 
that fails to cover the loss of income for the survivors and their families. Many workers 
and their families risk not getting any compensation at all, due to poor registration of 
workers, lengthy procedures to establish family relations (e.g. DNA tests), failing 
communication, and families and workers returning to home villages, amongst other 
things. In Pakistan, compensation is grounded in law. However, as workers are not 
registered with social security institutions, compensation is nevertheless out of reach 
for victims. 
                                                     
31
 ILO convention 121 is only ratified by 24 countries, and Bangladesh and Pakistan are not amongst 
them. 
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3. Ali Enterprises 
3.1. Factory fire 
On Tuesday, 11 September 2012, at around 6 pm, a devastating fire broke out at the 
Ali Enterprises factory in Karachi, Pakistan  The fire cost the lives of around 300 
workers. Some of the workers were burnt alive. Others died of suffocation.  Dozens 
more were injured, many severely. Months after the tragedy, the exact number of 
deceased and injured workers is still not clear. An Incident Report issued by the 
provincial Sindh government on 12 September, one day after the fire, reports 252 
casualties.  That same day, Geo Pakistan and Channel 4 reported the number of 
deaths as 289.  In an article published by Der Spiegel six weeks after the fire, 
workers’ representatives state that more than 300 people had lost their lives because 
of the fire. This article mentioned that 63 suspected dead are still officially counted as 
being missing. The families of these suspected dead provided DNA material so that it 
could be compared to that of the bodies that have already been recovered.  An article 
in the New York Times published on 7 December, however, spoke of at least 262 
workers killed by the fire. Early December, according to the Pakistan Institute of 
Labour Education and Research (PILER, an NGO based in Karachi), the government 
had established the official numbers at 262 dead (12 female, 250 male), of which at 
that time 220 were identified. The combined number of unidentified and missing was 
42 as per official account. 
 
Likewise, the number of injured workers is not clear. On 6 October, PILER wrote: 
“newspapers reports suggest 65 workers having been injured, but this number is 
unlikely to be accurate.”  The number of injured is expected to be much higher as Dr. 
Abdus Salam, form Karachi's Civil Hospital, is quoted  by Deutsche Welle as saying 
that at least 65 workers suffered broken bones after jumping out of windows. He does 
not speak about workers who suffered other types of injuries. 
 
There are several reasons that might explain the differences in the reported numbers 
of dead and injured workers. First, the death toll rose because it took rescue workers 
several days to gain access to certain parts of the factory.  In addition, some of the 
severely injured workers subsequently died. 
 
Days after the fire, there was great confusion about the number of workers that were 
present when the fire broke out. Estimates ranged from 500 to 1500 workers.  There 
are no attendance papers. In addition, most workers never signed a contract and 
were not registered as employees of Ali Enterprises with any social security 
institution. Data compiled by police investigators stated that “on September 11, when 
the fire broke out, 1,293 people had come to work”.  
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The cause of the fire remains unclear. On 13 September 2012, the BBC reported that 
a faulty electrical switch is thought to have caused a boiler to explode and that the 
flames set fire to chemicals stored in the building.  The Incidence Report of the Sindh 
government mentions as “possible cause of the fire”: “a) short circuiting” and “b) fire 
at the generator”.   
 
The high death toll has been attributed to the fact that workers were trapped inside 
the factory. There was only one accessible exit; the three other doors were locked.  
Windows on the lower floors were covered with metal bars. The factory was crammed 
with combustible materials, including piles of clothes and chemicals, and stairways 
were blocked. Fire alarms and sprinklers were not in place. The only exit from the 
basement was through the fabric store, which is where the fire broke out. Those 
workers still in the basement had no way of getting out and died when the basement 
filled with boiling water from the attempts to extinguish the fire. 
 
In an interview with the CCC, a survivor of the Ali Enterprises factory fire reported that 
all of the windows at Ali Enterprises were barred, preventing workers from escaping 
the building. The only exits available to workers were staircases located next to lift 
shafts through which the fire spread to the upper floors of the factory. With the dark 
and the smoke workers were unable to find their way to these exits. Other potential 
exits, which included doors between departments, were locked.   
 
In addition, fire fighters did not reach the factory until at least 75 minutes after the 
blaze erupted.  At a certain point, the fire brigade ran out of water. Chief Fire Officer 
Ehtishamuddin told the Express Tribune that the water supply to the fire station of 
Sindh Industrial Trading Estates (SITE, an industrial area established by the Sindh 
government) had been disconnected for years because of unpaid bills.
32
   
 
The chief of the Karachi fire department told media reporters that most of the bodies 
were found in the basement and on the first floor. He added that many bodies were 
charred beyond recognition and that in some cases rescue workers were not able to 
identify the victim’s gender.  Identification of the dead bodies was further hindered by 
the fact that most workers did not have a contract. Rescue workers said most of the 
victims died of smoke inhalation, and many of the survivors sustained third-degree 
burns. Many workers tried to escape from the burning building and jumped from the 
top floors, suffering broken bones. According to the News International, the majority 
of victims were below the age of 35 years.  
 
                                                     
32
  The Express Tribune, “Baldia factory fire: Fire station in SITE hasn’t had water in years over unpaid 
bills”, 29 September 2012 <http://tribune.com.pk/story/444159/baldia-factory-fire-fire-station-in-site-
hasnt-had-water-in-years-over-unpaid-bills/>  
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Box 1: Survivors’ testimonies 
 
Mohammad Saleem, 32, who broke a leg after jumping out of the second floor, said he and his 
colleagues were hard at work late Tuesday. ”It was terrible, suddenly the entire floor filled with 
fire and smoke and the heat was so intense that we rushed towards the windows, broke its 
steel grille and glass and jumped out,” Saleem said.
33
 
 
Another survivor, Allah Warayo, said there was a stampede as the fire spread. He ended up 
jumping from the third floor, but five members of his family did not escape. “We started running 
towards the exit. There were 150-200 people all running and pushing each other. I fell down 
unconscious. Then I managed to get some air from a vent. I started screaming. A crane made 
a hole in the wall and I was able to jump. I begged the rescue workers to help my relatives, but 
no-one paid any attention.”
34 
3.2. Company profile  
Ali Enterprises is a manufacturer of denim, woven, knitted and hosiery garments.
35
 
Production is mainly destined for the European and US markets. The company 
engages in pattern designing, cutting, stitching, washing, pressing, finishing and 
packaging textile products and has a production capacity of 10.000 garments a day.
36
 
There are no financial data publicly available about the company. According to the 
Chairman of SITE Association of Industry, Irfan Moton, annual sales of Ali Enterprises 
are estimated to be Rs. 5 billion (USD 51 million).
37
 The company is member of the 
Karachi Chamber of Commerce and Industries
38
 and the Pakistan Readymade 
Garments Manufacturers and Exporters Association (PRGMEA).
39
  
 
                                                     
33
  The News International, “Khi factory fire: Death toll rises to 289”, 12 September 2012  
< http://www.thenews.com.pk/article-67355-Karachi-factory-fire-death-toll-tops-100 > 
34
  BBC News Asia, “Death toll from Karachi factory fire soars”, 12 September 2012 < 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-19566851 > 
35
 Global Traders from Here website, “Ali Enterprises”, no date, < http://www.gmdu.net/corp-133327.html> 
(28 December 2012). 
36
 Ibid. 
37
 International Herald Tribune, “Factory inferno: Ali Enterprises’ assets frozen on SBP orders”, 19 
September 2012 <http://tribune.com.pk/story/438777/factory-inferno-ali-enterprises-assets-frozen-on-
sbp-orders/> 
38
 RINA website, “Evidence in Ali Enterprises case: Membership of Chamber of Commerce certificate of 
Ali Enterprises”, no date <http://www.rina.org/en/rina_details/ali_enterprises_certificates.aspx> (20 
December 2012). 
39
 PRGMEA website, “Member search; Ali Enterprises”, no date <http://prgmea.org/search.asp>, (20 
December 2012) 
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Ownership 
Ali Enterprises is a private company founded in 2000
40
 and owned by Abdul Aziz 
Bhaila
41
 and his sons Arshad Bhaila and Shahid Bhaila.
42
 Shahid Bhaila is the CEO of 
Ali Enterprises.
43
  
 
Location/premises 
In September 2012, Ali Enterprises had one operating factory in Karachi, Sindh 
Province. The factory was located on the Sindh Industrial Trading Estates.
44
 The 
factory was based in a three-storey building (ground floor, first floor and second floor). 
The building also included a basement.  
 
A ‘Certificate of Stability’ issued by Al-Habib architects, planners and engineers in 
March 2012 states that workers will be employed on four floors (basement, ground 
floor and two floors).
45
  However, after the fire, a senior officer with the Federal 
Investigation Agency – who wished to remain anonymous – told a reporter from the 
Pakistan News on Sunday that the factory’s “plot was actually allotted for a ground-
floor, small-industry unit only. Its approved capacity of workers was 250, but the 
factory owner expanded the 
hosiery unit into a leather 
garment and denim factory 
and constructed two extra 
floors illegally and hired 
1500 workers.”
46
 
 
 
 
 
 
Ali Enterprises, after the fire
47
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Workforce 
There is no certainty about the number of workers employed at Ali Enterprises at the 
time of the factory fire. PILER
48
, as well as several media reports, speak of a work 
force of 1,500 to 2,000 workers.
49
 The majority of the workers were male, and 
estimated ages of the majority of the workers are between 20 and 35 years old. A 
survivor told reporters from Der Spiegel that most of the workers were employed 
without a contract. Out of the total workforce, only 190 workers were registered with 
the Employees Old-Age Benefits Institution (EOBI).
50
 This means that formally, the 
factory employed only 190 workers. According to KiK, one of the buyers of Ali 
Enterprises, the latest report of auditing firm UL Responsible Sourcing (no date given) 
stated that Ali Enterprises employed 410 workers and that all these workers were 
given an employment contract. Additionally, KiK wrote that it is investigating how 
these contradictory statements were possible.
51
 
 
The majority of the workers were living in Orangi Town, a poor working-class 
neighbourhood in Karachi.
52
 Several survivors said that many workers employed at 
Ali Enterprises came from far-away areas in Pakistan.
53
 
 
In interviews with reporters from the New York Times, workers said that they worked 
60 hours or more a week, sometimes in 24-hour shifts.
54
 Workers told reporters from 
Der Spiegel that they were paid out on a piece-rate basis. "Depending on the size of 
the order, we earned between €1.50 and €5 every day," says one worker. Hardly any 
of them made more than 7,000 rupees (USD 72) a month.
55
 The same article 
mentions that workers regularly worked 14 hours a day.  
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3.3. Buyers 
To date, German retailer KiK is the only buyer that confirmed sourcing from Ali 
Enterprises. According to a New York Times article, one reporter found a pair of jeans 
bearing the Diesel brand on the factory’s premises after the fire. In a reaction, Diesel 
denied sourcing from Ali Enterprises.
56
 KiK and the auditing and certification bodies 
concerned state they are not able to provide information about Ali Enterprises’ 
buyers. KIK, however, is familiar with other buyers, as they indicated to be discussing 
compensation with other buyers. 
 
KiK (Germany) 
After the fire, labels with the name ‘OKAY Men’ were found in the factory.
57
 OKAY is a 
brand of KiK, a German clothing discounter that operates around 3200 stores 
throughout Europe.
58
 KiK only confirmed sourcing from Ali Enterprises after photos of 
garments recovered from the factory carrying the 'OKAY' logo were published. From a 
press release issued by KiK on 18 September 2012 it became clear that KiK had 
been sourcing from Ali Enterprises at least since 2007.
59
  
 
KiK’s Managing Director Sustainability & Corporate Communications Michael Arretz 
stated that KiK was responsible for 75 per cent of the factory's orders. However, 
according to an article in Der Spiegel Ali Enterprises workers said that, without a 
doubt, "at least 90 per cent" of the products produced were intended for KiK.
 60
 KiK, in 
its response to a draft version of this report, did not contradict this figure.  
3.4. Social auditing 
Social auditing by buyers: UL Responsible Sourcing (commissioned by 
KiK) 
KiK requires its suppliers to adhere to the KiK Code of Conduct. Compliance with the 
Code of Conduct is monitored by KiK or an authorised third party.
61
 In the case of Ali 
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Enterprises, social compliance audits were conducted by UL Responsible Sourcing. 
KiK’s Code of Conduct is based on “the conventions of the International Labour 
Organisation (ILO) and the respective norms of the United Nations”. The code 
includes provisions regarding “working atmosphere; working hours; compensation; 
conditions of employment; health and safety at work; forced labour; child labour; 
discrimination and; freedom of association”.
62
 
 
The paragraph on occupational health and safety states:  
 
“The workplace and the practice of the work must not harm employees’ or 
workers’ health and safety. A safe and clean working environment shall be 
provided. Occupational health and safety practices shall be promoted, which 
prevent accidents and injury in the course of work or as a result of the 
operation of employer facilities. These safety practices and procedures must 
be communicated to the employees as well as to the workers; they have to be 
trained in its effective usage. The same principles apply to all social facilities 
and accommodation facilities if provided by the employer.”
63
 
 
KiK stated that three social performance audits were conducted at Ali Enterprises by 
UL Responsible Sourcing. According to the information available these audits were 
conducted between 2007 and December 2011. In an article in Der Spiegel, KiK 
representative Michael Arretz said that no serious shortcomings were found during 
these audits and that in principle Ali Enterprises was a reliable supplier. 
 
In 2007, UL Responsible Sourcing conducted its first KiK commissioned audit at Ali 
Enterprises. The 2007 audit report revealed that Ali Enterprises failed to meet safety 
requirements.
64
 According to an article in Der Spiegel during this audit, open cable 
ends were found as well as unsecured electrical equipment and unlit emergency 
exits. In addition, the 2007 audit report revealed that working hours exceeded the 
maximum and were not documented properly.
65
 This required corrective actions. In 
press statements dated 18 September 2012/5 October 2012, KiK wrote that it 
received an audit report from UL Responsible Sourcing on 30 December 2011, which 
stated that all necessary corrective actions had been undertaken.
66
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SA8000 
The SA8000 standard - developed by Social Accountability International (SAI), a non-
governmental, multi stakeholder organisation – is a social certification standard for 
socially responsible employment practices, based on the auditing of workplaces.
67
 
More than 3000 facilities have been SA8000 certified worldwide.
 68 
The SA8000 
standard covers various elements, related to the protection of basic human rights of 
workers, such as; child labour, forced and compulsory labour, health and safety, 
freedom of association, discrimination etc.  
 
The SA8000 certificate is issued after a certification audit has been carried out. The 
certification audit is carried out in two stages: the readiness review and the 
certification audit. These two audits are always announced. Certification lasts for 
three years, with a series of required surveillance audits (announced and 
unannounced) throughout this three year period.
69
 Outcomes of these audits are not 
disclosed because, according to SAI, “workers should be able to share information 
freely, confidentially, and without fear of retribution.”
70
  Workers and their 
organisations however have repeatedly challenged this and requested SAI to share 
this information with them and publicly.  
 
The SA8000 standard and audit process is factory based and does not include any 
requirement to investigate or verify the buyers at a certified company, nor does the 
process include analysis of buyers at certified companies.  The audit process focuses 
on management systems and the eight performance elements in the SA8000 
Standard. 
71
 Regarding the buyers of Ali Enterprises, CCC, in a letter to SAI and 
SAAS (Social Accountability Accreditation Services), dated 1 October 2012 writes: 
“whether or not SAI and SAAS currently have this information, you clearly have the 
right and responsibility to demand it of your accredited auditing organization, RINA 
(Registro Italiano Navale Group). We have no doubt that RINA has such information 
and we have no doubt that SAI and SAAS can get this information from RINA. If you 
have failed to do so, then you should rectify this immediately”.
72
 
 
SA8000 certifications may be issued by certification bodies that have received 
accreditation from SAAS. SAAS is an accreditation agency founded to accredit and 
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monitor organizations as certifiers of compliance with social standards, including the 
SA8000 standard.
73
 
 
The Pakistan government had a long-running subsidy programme (2007 – 2012) to 
encourage the certification of companies to the SA8000 standard in order to advance 
Pakistan’s acceptance as a worthy sourcing base for global buyers. Under the 
subsidy scheme the government of Pakistan pays half of the cost of an SA8000 
certification up to a certain ceiling. Approved consultants preparing companies for the 
scheme and certification bodies are also signatories to the agreement that pays out 
fully only when and if a certificate has been issued. 
 
SAI/SAAS claim that the Ali Enterprises application for certification did not come 
through or use the government incentive programme.
74
  SAI/ SAAS state that “neither 
SAI nor SAAS participated in the establishment or design of the programme. In 
November 2011, SAAS sent a memo to the three certification bodies then operating in 
Pakistan expressing its concerns and clarifying expectations in managing the subsidy 
programme. An excerpt of this memo reads:  
 
“SAAS finds that a direct contractual agreement between the government of 
Pakistan and a CB [Certification Body] for direct payment of the latter's 
certification of an account to SA8000 is not a contravention, in and of itself, of 
any existing rules or procedures. Nonetheless, it would seem to increase the 
probability and likelihood of conflict of interest situations. The practice of an 
entity only paying for the auditing services rendered if the facility passes the 
certification leads to concern about impartiality - that the CB cannot be 
impartial in rendering a decision for fear of not being paid for its auditing 
services. The CB must be able to show how impartiality is maintained in such 
circumstances.”
75
 
 
Notwithstanding these concerns, the SAAS website shows that Pakistan has the fifth 
largest number of SA8000 certifications worldwide.76 Of the 164 certificates issued to 
facilities in Pakistan, 96 of them were audited by RINA.77  
 
Certification of Ali Enterprises  
Ali Enterprises received the SA8000 certification on 20 August 2012, just three weeks 
before the tragedy. Ali Enterprises received the certificate via a complicated process, 
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which involved subcontracted parties. Ali Enterprises’ SA8000 certification was issued 
by RINA.  However, RINA never visited Ali Enterprises. It had subcontracted the 
Regional Inspection & Certification Agency (RI&CA) from Pakistan to perform the 
actual audits,
78
 an approach allowed at the time by SAAS. RI&CA is not accredited by 
SAAS and has a controversial reputation because of its unusually high rate of 
approvals in Pakistan.
79
 Certification decisions, based in large part on RI&CA audits 
reports, were made by RINA.
80
 
 
According to SAI, Ali Enterprises had undergone two announced initial certification 
audits. The next audit was again going to be an announced visit and the subsequent 
one was going to be an unannounced visit.
81
 According to RINA, Ali Enterprises was 
visited between 22 June and 5 July 2012 with a total of ten days spent on site.
82
 
According to RINA, the audit report from RI&CA mentioned that: 
 
“Fire extinguisher and fire safety buckets were available in sufficient quantity; 
“fire extinguishers were visible and accessible to all workers; access to fire 
extinguishers and passages leading to exits was maintained free from any 
kind of obstruction; primary exits and emergency exits are kept unlocked 
while employees are inside facility; emergency procedures exist, including 
record of regular emergency drills, fire-fighting training.”
83
 
 
According to RINA safety trainings and fire drills were carried out at Ali Enterprises. In 
addition, emergency exists were in place, as were evacuation plans and fire 
prevention and extinction measures. According to RINA this is confirmed by 
certificates and photographs taken on the site during the audit. Among the certificates 
for Ali Enterprises on the RINA website are the following:
84
  
 Basic Training of Fire Fighting certificate, issued by A.S. Fumigation & Fire 
Services on 2 April 2012. According to the certificate ten workers participated 
in this training. 
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 Fire Drill certificate, issued by A.S. Fumigation & Fire Services on 2 April 
2012. According to this certificate all workers [there is no mentioning of the 
number of workers] participated in a fire drill on 2 April 2012.  
 
An interview conducted with a survivor of Ali Enterprises by a CCC delegation to 
Pakistan in January 2013 contradicted these statements. When asked about fire 
training he categorically stated that neither he nor any of his colleagues had been 
given any kind of fire training in the one and a half years he had worked at the factory. 
When the catastrophic fire broke out on 11 September, workers tried to use the fire 
extinguishers in an attempt to put out the fire but none of workers knew how they 
were supposed to be used and these efforts failed.
85
  
 
In addition, a report by the International Labor Rights Forum (ILRF) contains 
information from a Pakistani auditor who audited Ali Enterprises in 2010 and 2011 on 
behalf of a well-known international auditing firm and its client, an apparel brand. The 
auditor told ILRF that he had found several serious non-compliances but that nobody 
listened to him. He told ILRF that management showed him documents supposedly 
signed by the workers, stating that they had received both fire safety and first aid 
trainings as required by law. But workers told him that they had never attended such 
trainings and they had not signed the documents. In addition, the auditor said that the 
factory’s fire safety exit was opened for auditors, but otherwise locked, with a guard 
posted in front.
86
  
 
Worldwide Responsible Accredited Production (WRAP) 
Worldwide Responsible Accredited Production (WRAP) is an independent, global 
non-profit organisation dedicated to the certification of facilities engaged in lawful, 
humane and ethical production.
87
 WRAP certifies facilities, not brands. The 
certification process starts when a facility has completed the application form. If a 
factory demonstrates full compliance with the WRAP principles during an audit 
conducted by an accredited organisation, it is certified for one year. Unannounced 
follow-up audits are conducted on a selected number of factories based on a risk 
profile to ensure they maintain compliance. If they are found not to be in compliance, 
they either receive a written corrective action plan or they are decertified, based on 
the severity of the violations.
88
 The WRAP Principles cover core labour standards and 
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include a principle on health and safety (“Facilities will provide a safe and healthy 
work environment”).
89
 
 
Ali Enterprises was WRAP-certified until late 2011.
90
 WRAP certified Ali Enterprises in 
2007, 2008 and 2010. The certification expired in late 2011 and was not renewed by 
Ali Enterprises. During the audits, no violations of the WRAP principles were found. In 
an article in Women’s Wear Daily magazine, WRAP Chairman Charles Masten 
referred to the audits performed at the factory; “I can feel comfortable that when that 
auditor went into the factory on that day and completed an audit, all those entrances 
and exit were not locked”.
91
 He acknowledged that all bets are off when the auditors 
leave a factory. “An audit is a snapshot when you go in there,” Masten said. “All hell 
can break loose as soon as the auditors leave.  That is the reason that with all WRAP 
agreements up front, we let them know we will come back unannounced at any time 
we want to see if they are adhering to our principles. We don’t even tolerate doors 
being obstructed with big shipments that prevent workers from getting in and out of 
the factory.” 
3.5. Actions undertaken after the fire 
Civil society organisations 
The National Trade Union Federation of Pakistan (NTUF) reacted swiftly to the 
accident by organising a protest demonstration in Karachi on the 12
th
 of September. 
Street protests continued during the weeks following the fire.  
 
IndustriALL launched a petition at LabourStart, an international on-line news and 
campaign site, targeting the government of Pakistan to ensure compensation would 
be paid to the families of dead workers, injured workers and that the Ali Enterprises 
workers continue to receive their salaries. In addition, they called upon the 
government to arrest the employer and charge him with murder and take action 
against the labour department and government authorities that failed to ensure the 
safety and health of these workers. 24,975 people joined this campaign and sent an 
email to the Pakistan government.
92
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On the 22
nd
 of September, the Workers Rights Movement (WRM) was formed, 
consisting of 70 trade unions, labour and human rights organisations, youth, women, 
and student organisations, and political parties, amongst others. The WRM aims to 
launch a movement for the implementation of labour laws, compensation to the 
families of the deceased workers, compensation for the injured and for other workers 
who lost their livelihoods due to the fire, closure of the factory, and the arrest of 
factory owners and confiscation of their assets and bank accounts.
93
  
 
Based on news reports, worker interviews and labels found on-site, CCC contacted 
brands and retailers. On 17 September 2012, CCC released information that KIK had 
been found as a major buyer, yet the company refused to take action with respect to 
compensation, disclosing audit reports and engaging with worker representatives in 
Pakistan.
94
 This was followed by an international campaign aimed at KiK, launched 
on 16 October 2012. The demands, developed with the Workers Rights Movement, 
are that KIK ensures transparency, compensation and employment, preventive 
measures and supports an independent investigation (see box 2).
95
  
 
On the 1
st
 of October 2012, prior to the SAI Advisory Board Meeting on 9-11 October, 
international labour groups sent a letter to SAI, followed by a press release, 
demanding disclosure of audit reports and buyer names.
96
 In an answer to this letter, 
SAI and SAAS denied any responsibility for the fire citing confidentiality agreements 
as the reason neither they nor the Italian auditing company, RINA, can share any 
information they possess about the factory.
97  
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Box 2: Demands towards KiK  
 
- Transparency: disclose audit reports of UL Responsible Sourcing (hired by KIK) and disclose 
the names of other buyers sourcing from Ali Enterprises and with which KIK claims to be 
negotiating. 
 
- Compensation, wages and employment to victims: negotiate directly with the Workers 
Right Movement to ensure all the injured workers receive full medical care without charge, that 
wages continue to be paid, that the families of the dead workers and the injured receive full 
compensation and a pension covering future loss of income, and that survivors will be provided 
employment at other KiK supplying factories.  
 
- Preventive measures:  take measures to prevent future disasters. This includes a full safety 
review of all suppliers involving worker representatives; providing health and safety training for 
all workers; ensure that workers can freely organize and express themselves; publicly disclose 
the supplier list; ensure all workplaces are registered and that all workers have a contract; pay 
prices that allow for all necessary remediation measures to be undertaken.  
 
- Investigation into the cause of the fire:  actively support and participate in a full, 
independent and transparent investigation into the cause of the fire. This investigation should 
look at the failure of government, owner and buyers to prevent, detect or remediate the 
violations of occupations health and safety rules and labour laws that led to the death of more 
than[one hundred workers. This investigation should also yield a complete list of those who 
died in the factory fire.  
 
Judicial actions 
The police arrested factory owners Arshad Bhaila and Shahid Bhaila after their pre-
arrest bail applications were rejected on October 6, 2012. Abdul Aziz Bhaila, father of 
the Bhaila brothers and co-owner of the factory, was granted bail due to health 
issues.
98
 Police in Karachi had registered a murder case against the owners. 
However, two weeks after Prime Minster Mr. Ashraf recommended in an address to 
Karachi business leaders on 29 December 2012 that the main murder charge against 
the Bhaila brothers – one that carries a potential death sentence – would be 
withdrawn, a senior police official applied with the court to have the charges 
dropped.
99
 The court has accepted a petition from labour rights groups, including 
PILER, to prevent removal of these charges. 
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On the 11
th
 of February 2013 the Sindh High Court awarded bail to all the accused. 
Factory owners Arshad Bhaila and Shahid Bhaila had to submit security bonds worth 
RS 1 million while the other accused had to submit bonds worth RS. 2000.
100 
On 18 September 2012, PILER, together with other CSOs, trade unions and 
individuals,
101
 filed a petition with the Sindh High Court. The petition pleas for the 
following: (1) establish a judicial commission that should investigate the causes of the 
fire; assign responsibility and liability; determine compensation for families of the 
victims and; issue recommendations for the avoidance of industrial tragedies; (2) 
demand reasonable and appropriate financial compensation for the victims to be paid 
by Ali Enterprises, the Government of Pakistan and the Government of Sindh; (3) 
conduct a criminal trial against the accused (factory owners) and; (4) Direct the 
Government of Sindh and the Provincial Labour Ministry to immediately conduct a 
survey and inspection of all labour establishments, factories and industrial units in  
the Sindh Province, in order to ensure the implementation of fire and safety provisions 
under the labour laws and to submit a comprehensive report in this regard to the 
court.
102
 
 
Follow-up actions by SAI and SAAS 
In a response to a draft version of this report SAI, as the SA8000 standard owner, 
wrote that it has identified numerous revisions and changes to improve the current 
accreditation and certification methods and requirements. SAI wrote that “a wide 
range of changes in the certification and the accreditation system are necessary to 
avoid the award of certificates to facilities not actually in compliance with SA8000.” 
Risk factors must be identified in order to provide potential indicators of non-
conformance. No further specification on what these changes would include has been 
given. The SA8000 Standard and Guidance Document is being reviewed and 
amended, with key focus on the health and safety element.
103
 SAI further writes that 
“one of the many learnings” for SAI is that “the identification of buyers at certified 
factories is of such great interest to stakeholders that any such information in an 
SA8000 audit must be verified”. It remains unclear if this information, if available, will 
be made public. SAI adds that it will be working with SAI corporate member 
companies on these issues and will call on governments to enforce their labour 
laws.
104
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SAI also said it has begun working with its Advisory Board and SAAS to undertake an 
extensive investigation in Pakistan – “not just of Ali Enterprises, but also of the quality 
and reliability of the other SA8000certificates there.” According to SAI the 
investigative efforts in Pakistan will include an on-site fact finding investigation in the 
conditions of the Ali Enterprises factory prior to the fire, as well as oversight of the 
investigation by RINA of the circumstances regarding the issuance of the SA8000 
certificate to Ali Enterprises, and oversight of internal review and assessment of 
management by RINA of Pakistan activities. SAAS has commissioned AKUT to 
undertake unannounced fire safety visits to 17 certified factories to understand the 
state of the certified facilities in Pakistan. To date no outcomes of this investigation 
have been shared. 
 
The number of unannounced SA8000 audits in high-risk countries will be increased. 
In addition SAAS will issue requirements for more in-depth stakeholder consultations 
and more rigorous requirements for health and safety and management. Because of 
these anticipated revisions, SAAS temporarily suspended consideration of all new 
accreditation applications. The SAAS website offers information about RINA. RINA’s 
scope of accreditation is currently described as “global, excluding Pakistan”. SAAS 
mentions that two Certification Bodies are still active in Pakistan. SAAS has notified 
these Certification Bodies that no new SA8000 certificates are to be issued until 
SAAS has concluded its analysis. SAAS has also notified the CBs that they should 
conduct unannounced fire safety inspections at all existing SA8000 clients. SAAS 
provides oversight of these fire safety visits to certified facilities. 
 
According to SAAS, one of the major learnings from the Ali Enterprises fire is that 
subcontracting in high risk countries such as Pakistan carries too high a risk. 
Therefore, SAAS has decided to prohibit any and all subcontracting of certification-
related activity in a specified set of high risk countries. In addition, oversight of 
certification bodies in high risk countries will be increased. It is unclear how this will 
be organised. SAAS wrote that a long-term and comprehensive review of the audit 
system has begun. The outcome of the investigations and actions taken in Pakistan 
shall be taken into account in determining further actions and/ or policy changes.
105
  
Following the Ali Enterprises factory fire, UNI Global Union decided to step down from 
the SAI Advisory Board out of dissatisfaction with the way SAI followed up the case. 
With this resignation UNI Global Union is distancing itself from the SAI certification 
system. 
 
Worldwide Responsible Accredited Production (WRAP) 
In response to the fire, WRAP announced that it will conduct fire safety awareness 
trainings throughout Pakistan, in cooperation with the Pakistan Readymade Garments 
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Manufacturers and Exporters Association (PRGMEA).
106
 In response to a draft 
version of this report, WRAP wrote to SOMO and CCC that five fire safety awareness 
sessions took place in Pakistan in December 2012.  
 
The trainings are specifically aimed at fire prevention, through understanding and 
conducting factory risk assessments. WRAP further explained that the training 
programme was developed almost two years ago when WRAP opened an office in 
Bangladesh and it became clear that fire safety was becoming an increasingly 
significant concern.
107
  
3.6. Compensation 
End of October 2012, labour organisations including local labour rights group PILER 
calculated that for fair and just compensation based on international standards and 
good practice at least 20 million Euro will be needed, covering damages as well as 
loss of income, for the families of all deceased.
108
 These calculations were based on 
50% of a wage that minimally provides for a basic income for a family, or Rs 20,000 
per month
109
 for 35 years, and a lump sum of Rs. 3.3 million for pain and suffering. If 
inflation correction would be taken into account,
110
 the total amount of compensation 
would be three times higher. This is taking the official death toll of 262 victims as a 
basis. 
 
So far, however, discussions about victim compensation have advanced very slowly 
and are highly uncoordinated. To date, a number of the injured workers and the 
families of at least 42 unidentified dead workers have still not received any financial 
compensation at all.  Under Pakistan’s Workers Welfare Ordinance, a death grant is 
provided to the family of a worker who died as a result of a work-related accident or 
disease. In May 2012, the amount to be paid to the family of the deceased worker was 
set at Rs. 500,000 (USD 5,120). This amount is only paid out if the worker is 
registered with the Employees Old-Age Benefit Institution (EOBI) or with the Social 
Security Institute.
111
 Because the great majority of workers at Ali Enterprises were not 
registered with the EOBI or with the Social Security Institute, the families of the 
deceased workers would not be eligible for this compensation scheme. The fact that 
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most workers were not registered, as well as the fact that 42 bodies have not been 
identified to date, is hampering compensation efforts.   
 
Order by the Sindh High Court 
On 29 January 2013, the Sindh High Court set up a commission to distribute 
compensation to the legal heirs of the Ali Enterprises factory fire victims. The total 
amount of the compensation was established to be Rs.167.5 million (USD 1,7 
million). The counsel of the factory owners Amir Raza Naqvi said that compensation 
worth Rs. 61.8 million (USD 629,280) would be taken from the accounts of the factory 
owners. The court observed that the compensation process could be concluded 
within two months.
112
  
 
Government compensation 
Different Pakistan governmental bodies have, over the past months, announced to 
pay out compensation to families of deceased works and to injured workers.To date, 
it is still unclear which of these promises have been fulfilled.  
 
On 22 September 2012, Prime Minister Raja Pervez Ashraf reportedly issued 
cheques of Rs. 400,000 (around USD 4,100) to compensate 210 families of deceased 
workers. On the same occasion, Chief Minister Syed Qaim Ali Shah of the Sindh 
provincial government issued cheques of Rs. 300,000 (USD 3,069) for each family of 
these deceased workers. These families thus received Rs. 700,000 each in total. In 
addition, in total 15 injured workers received cheques of Rs 100,000 (around USD 
1,000) from the Chief Minister, as well as cheques of Rs. 50,000 (USD 511) from the 
Sindh provincial government.
 113  
The latter is, however, refuted by local labour group 
PILER, which stated that as of 6 March 2013, the 15 injured workers only received 
Rs. 100,000.   
 
On 14 September 2012, leader of the Pakistan Muslim League, Mian Nawaz Sharif, 
announced that the Punjab Government would issue Rs. 300.000 (USD 3,069) in aid 
to the victims’ families.
114
  
 
The Prime Minster further directed the Federal Labour and Manpower Ministry to give 
Rs. 500.000 (USD 5,120) each to the heirs of the workers killed in the fire.
115
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Besides the above mentioned lump sum payments, the Old-Age Benefit Institution 
(EOBI) announced it would pay a monthly Rs. 3,600 (USD 36) pension to injured 
workers and to families of deceased workers.
116
 The Sindh Employees Social 
Security Institute announced that they will pay the treatment costs of workers involved 
in the tragedy.
117
 
 
To date, there is no information available that these different compensation amounts 
indeed all have been paid out. What is clear, however, is that many injured workers 
and families of the deceased have not received any compensation at all.  
 
Buyers’ compensation: KiK 
At the end of October 2012, KiK announced that it would pay out a combined 
USD500,000 (€383,700) to the families of the deceased. Counting 259 victims, this 
means an amount of around USD1,930 per victim.
118
 Der Spiegel quotes Nasir 
Mansoor of Pakistan’s National Trade Union Federation (NTUF): “That's not that 
much at all." "Furthermore, we don't know when and how the payment is supposed to 
come through."
119
 
 
Civil society organisations (among them PILER and CCC) continued to pressurise 
KiK to come up with an adequate compensation scheme. Subsequently, on 5 January 
2013, PILER announced that it had signed a Memorandum of Understanding with KiK 
regarding compensation for the victims of the factory fire. The agreed compensation 
scheme consists of two phases. In the first phase, compensation will be given to 
families of deceased workers that have thus far not received any compensation from 
the government. KiK has agreed to extend USD1 million to these families.  
 
KIK also expressed a willingness to compensate workers who faced severe injuries in 
the fire leading to disability and loss of future employment. The remaining workers will 
be assisted in the next step after a compensation amount is agreed upon through a 
consensus between all stakeholders including employers and other international 
companies.
.120
 PILER announced that it will be filing a petition with the Sindh High 
Court and request for the establishment of an independent commission to oversee 
the compensation process. In addition, KiK announced it will provide for USD 250,000 
for training and prevention measures.
121
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Donations 
The Bahria Town Group, a local real estate company, apparently motivated by charity 
considerations, has donated amounts of Rs. 200,000 (USD 2,046) to 178 families. In 
addition the Bahria Town Group donated amounts of Rs. 100,000 (USD 1,023) to 
seven injured workers.
122
 
3.7. Conclusions 
This case demonstrates how both the government of Pakistan and corporate actors 
involved failed to meet their respective duty to protect and their responsibility to 
respect workers’ rights. Tragically, this has led to the death of almost 300 workers. 
Dozens other suffered injuries and loss of income. To date, numerous families still 
await compensation.  
 
Failure to prevent the fire 
Factory management failed to provide workers with a safe working environment. 
Equally, the Pakistani government failed to enforce existing laws and regulations 
regarding safe workplaces. In Sindh Province, where Karachi is located, regulatory 
labour inspections are repetitively put off. Instead, by promoting and subsidizing 
private certification schemes, the government increasingly relied on commercial 
certification bodies to guarantee proper workplace conditions. Ali Enterprises had 
been awarded the SA8000 certification only three weeks before the fire. Safety risks, 
such as barred windows, the absence of fire alarms and sprinklers, locked exit doors, 
etc. went unnoticed by the auditors. Instead, auditors relied on documents that falsely 
stated workers participated in fire safety trainings.  
 
The example of KiK, to date the only buyer identified at Ali Enterprises, also shows 
the weaknesses of social auditing. While KiK did detect fire safety risks at its supplier 
already in 2007, the company did not act adequately upon these risks. It remains 
unclear how UL Responsible Sourcing, the auditing company commissioned by KiK, 
came to the conclusion that all earlier detected code violations had been resolved in 
December 2011 (date of the last auditing report by UL responsible Sourcing). KIK has 
not provided any information about how conditions have been monitored or assessed 
between December 2011 and September 2012. 
 
In their response to a draft version of this report SAI and SAAS acknowledged that “a 
wide range of changes in the certification and the accreditation system are necessary 
to avoid the award of certificates to facilities not actually in compliance with 
SA8000”.The actions proposed by SAI/SAAS so far, predominantly focus on 
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improving the existing system. The case shows that the audit firms used by SAI lack 
sufficient knowledge about safety conditions in garment factories. This has been 
acknowledged by SAI, SAAS and garment brands. However, increasing the 
competence of general auditors on safety is not expected to solve this issue. What is 
needed is auditors with a sound technical background that are supervised by 
independent safety experts.
123
 They furthermore need to operate within a system that 
is transparent, enforceable, and allows for workers to directly be involved. The 
SAI/SAAS responses do not clarify how the existing system will be altered. SOMO 
and CCC fear SAI/SAAS show no intention to fundamentally alter their existing 
system. Instead they seem are just to be looking for a technical fix by restricting the 
subcontracting of audits within the confines of high-risk countries. 
 
While SAI and SAAS expressed an intention to increase stakeholder involvement, 
they fail to deal with the issue of flawed freedom of association in Pakistan. Factory 
workers are the best placed to provide credible day-to-day observations about 
working conditions and implementation of safety measures. As long as garment 
workers in Pakistan cannot organise, engaging stakeholders on international level will 
not suffice.  
 
Failure to provide full redress to victims 
Factory management failed to provide employees with a contract and to register most 
workers with social security institutions as only 190 out of the estimated 2,000 
workers were registered with the EOBI. The Pakistan government failed to assure 
that companies adhere to national labour laws. The fact that the majority of workers at 
Ali Enterprises were not registered as such makes it difficult for them to prove they 
had an employment relationship with the factory in order to be eligible for 
compensation or covering of unpaid wages and receiving severance benefits from the 
moment their employment relationship was terminated because of the closure of the 
factory. In addition, the fact that most workers were not registered in combination with 
the unrecognisable state of many bodies makes identification of deceased workers 
extremely difficult.  
 
Victim compensation is going at a very slow pace and is highly uncoordinated. 
Compensation offered is not in line with to international standards to cover for loss of 
future income. To date, some of the injured workers as well as the families of the 42 
unidentified dead workers have still not received any financial compensation at all. 
Months after the fire, only 210 families out of the official total of 262, have received an 
amount of USD 7,169 each from different government bodies which is ten times lower 
than what is estimated to be a fair compensation amount. Other promises for 
compensation have not yet been fulfilled. At first, KiK announced a unilaterally 
decided upon compensation plan. Only after extensive campaigning by local and 
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international civil society organisations, KiK reconsidered this plan and agreed to 
discuss compensation with Pakistani labour groups. SAI and SAAS have not yet 
come forward with any compensation plans.  
 
Both KiK and SAI/SAAS have refused to release audit reports and other information 
obtained through the process of auditing, such as any observations about possible 
other buyers. Where KiK and SAI/SAAS maintain that audit processes are not 
organised to yield such information, SOMO and CCC stress that disclosure of any 
available information is crucial is order to enable workers to get access to redress.  
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4. Tazreen Fashions Limited 
4.1. Factory fire 
A horrific fire broke out at the Tazreen Fashions factory on 24 November 2012, killing 
at least 112 factory workers. The fire broke out at around 6.30pm, a time when most 
workers had already left the premises, according to a garment industry official.
124
 
Around 600 workers were present when the fire started, he added. According to 
Director Mohammed Shahjahan, 1,137 workers were present on the day of the 
incident.
125
 The fire began on the ground level at the storage facility where fabrics and 
yarns were stored.  
 
The flames spread quickly. Although the fire alarm started, management staff ordered 
the workers on the various factory floors to keep working.
126
 The staff told workers 
that nothing had happened, at the same time as turning up the radio’s volume. When 
panic started to spread, workers on the upper floors found out that it had become 
impossible to escape through the main exit, located on ground level where the fire 
had started. The lights failed and the factory quickly filled with smoke and heat, 
making it almost impossible for the workers to find their way out.  
 
In addition, survivors told Bangladeshi labour rights NGO Ain o Shalish Kendra (ASK) 
that management staff had locked the gates at several floors of the building.
127
 Many 
of the workers jumped to their deaths trying to escape from the burning six storey 
building. Others, unable to escape the blaze, were burned alive. Incident reports 
claim the fire injured between 100 and 300
128
 workers that day of which, according to 
the BGMEA, 48 are long-term injured.
129
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The emergency call came in at around 7pm; 30 minutes after the inferno had started, 
according to a senior station officer with the Dhaka fire department.
130
 His units 
arrived at the scene at 7.19pm. By then, the fire had already reached the fifth floor of 
the factory. 
 
Most of the victims were women, according to a government probe report.
131
 Almost 
half of the victims were burned beyond recognition and were buried under 
government supervision after DNA samples were taken. A police official later 
disclosed that they had buried 53 unidentified bodies on 27 November. Six men and 
43 women were among the bodies. Four of the 53 bodies could not be identified 
according to their gender.
132
 By 16 February 2013, 43 out of the 53 unidentified 
bodies had been identified.133  
 
What caused the fire is topic of debate. The first reports suggested the fire was 
started by an electrical short circuit.
134
 Over 80% of all factory fires in Bangladesh are 
due to faulty wiring.135 On 17 December, a Bangladesh government committee issued 
a 214-page report on the incident.
136
 The panel called the incident “an act of 
sabotage.”
137
 The head of the government committee, Main Uddin Khandaker, added; 
"We're sure it was an act of sabotage, but it needs further investigation by an 
intelligence or police agency to ascertain who was behind this act of sabotage.” He 
later added; "There was no possibility of fire originating from an electric short-circuit, 
as there was no electric wire close to the place. It came from outside.”
138
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Worker rights movement ASK and the Bangladesh Centre for Workers Solidarity 
criticised the report outcome as the report failed to point out who was responsible for  
the sabotage, how and why.
139
 The Bangladesh Centre for Workers Solidarity 
rejected the claim by Mr. Khandaker that there was no possibility of short-circuiting. 
The director of Bangladesh Centre for Workers Solidarity visited the factory and 
claimed he had seen “a sub-station and a generator only three feet off the warehouse 
on the ground floor.”
140
 
 
Several investigation reports from civil society organisations repeat the same 
conclusions on what has caused the high death toll and fire risks
141
: 
 The building code was not followed during construction of the building; 
 The factory only had three narrow staircases for the workers; the rest of the 
staircases had been removed from the inside of the ground floor; 
 There were no emergency exits or stairways; 
 There were insufficient fire defense materials, most of them were unused. 
Most of the workers were unable to use those materials; 
 There were no automated fire defense systems; 
 There were no sufficient water sources inside or outside of the factory; 
 The ground floors were being used as a storage facility which was 
unauthorized and induced rapid spreading of fire;  
 Two high voltage electricity transformers were located at the ground floor; 
 The stock of spin and fabric was located close to the high voltage 
transformer; 
 The size of the main entrance was not suitably sized for the number of 
employees and size of the building; 
 Gates were locked; 
 The front entrance and other side entrances of the factory were very 
congested.  
4.2. Company profile  
Tazreen Fashions Limited (hereafter Tazreen Fashions) is a garment manufacturer 
located in Ashulia, Dhaka in Bangladesh. Tazreen Fashions was incorporated in 
March, 2009.
142
  The factory opened its doors in May 2010.
143
 At the time of the 
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factory fire, Tazreen Fashions produced T-shirts, fleece vests and polo shirts that 
were exported to various European countries, as well as to the US. The company 
reported an annual turnover of approximately US$36 million.
144
 
 
Ownership 
Tazreen Fashions is part of the Tuba Group, which is a holding company that 
includes 13 garment manufacturers, all located in Bangladesh.
145
 The group employs 
nearly 7,000 workers and has the capacity to produce near 300.000 garments a day. 
According to the company it is “strictly maintaining safety, health and hygiene 
provisions as per ILO’s and Bangladesh labour law’s rules and regulation.
146
 The 
Managing Director of Tuba Group is Delowar Hossain. At the time of the fire, 
Mohamed Shahjahan was director at Tazreen Fashions. 
 
Location/premises 
The Tazreen Fashions factory is located in Nischintapur, Ashulia, Dhaka, Bangladesh. 
It is a nine storey building with a total floor surface of 13,935 m
2
.
147
  A state official told 
the New York Times that, at the time of the fire, the three top floors were under 
construction
148
, due to a predicted increase in orders by the management. A Workers’ 
Welfare Officer at Tazreen Fashions told investigative reporters after the incident that 
the factory; “was approved by the fire service and civil defence. She complained that 
no one from the Chief Inspector of Factories and Establishment ever inspected the 
factory although it is in provisions of the law. Instead, sparing a small amount of 
money for their “expenses” was enough to get the application approved on mobile 
phone.”
149
 BBC reporters found that the factory had permission to work on only three 
of the nine floors, while employees were working on at least six floors.
150
 Sukkur 
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Mahmud, Chairman of the National Coordination Committee for Workers' Education, 
also mentioned that the owners of Tazreen had permission for operations in a three 
storey building.151  
 
Tazreen Fashions factory, after the fire.
152
  
 
Workforce 
As with Ali Enterprises in Karachi, there is uncertainty about the number of workers 
employed at the Tazreen Fashions factory in Dhaka. Company documents state that 
1,700 people were employed by the company.
153
 However, company director, 
Mohammed Shahjahan, told reporters that Tazreen Fashions only employed 1,163 
workers.
154
 KiK wrote that its agency had informed them that 1,180 were employed at 
Tazreen Fashions.
155
 The Bangladesh Labour Welfare Foundation reported that as 
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many as 1800 people were employed
156
 and the New York Times
157
 reported 1,500 
people working at the factory before the incident. The Parliamentary Standing 
Committee on Labor, that is investigating the incident, confirmed that Tazreen 
Fashions maintained records of the workers it employed, but did not provide a 
decisive answer to the question of the number of people employed.
158
  
Most of the workers were young rural women with little education, according to New 
York Times reporters.
159
 The employees reportedly earned around USD45 per 
month.
160
 Several workers told Odhikar, a Bangladesh human rights NGO that 
investigated the incident, that they often received their salary late and that the amount 
they received was less than the amount they had agreed upon.
161
 There was no 
registered factory union at Tazreen Fashions. However national trade union 
federations, including the National Garment Workers Federation (NGWF) and the 
Bangladesh Garment & Industrial Workers Federation (BGIWF), had registered 
members among the Tazreen employees.  
4.3. Buyers 
Tazreen Fashions produced for the following brands and retailers: C&A (Germany), 
Walmart (US), Li & Fung (Hong Kong), Dickies (US), Sears (US), Edinburgh Woolen 
Mill (UK), Hipercor (Spain), Enyce (US), Karl Rieker (Germany), KiK (Germany), 
Piazza Italia (Italy), Delta Apparel (US) and Teddy Smith (France). Orders were 
placed either directly with the factory, or through the Tuba Group, other suppliers 
and/or agents.162 
 
C&A 
Shortly after the incident, C&A labels were found in the factory. In addition, a factory 
worker told the New York Times reporters she was working on C&A clothing when the 
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fire started.163 On 25 November  2012, C&A confirmed the contractual relation with 
Tazreen Fashion, C&A had commissioned the company to manufacture 220,000 
sweaters to be delivered to C&A Brazil between December 2012 and February 
2013.”
164
 
 
Walmart 
Walmart labels were also found in the burned-down factory.
165
 Two days after the fire, 
on 26 November, Walmart said in a statement that the factory was no longer 
authorised to produce merchandise for Walmart. The company declined to say when 
exactly it had stopped working with Tazreen and for what reasons. According to 
Walmart, another supplier, which was later identified as Success Apparel, had 
subcontracted work to Tazreen “without authorization and in direct violation of our 
policies”.
166
 
 
Documents from mid-September, found in the factory after the fire, indicate that five 
of the 14 production lines were making apparel for Walmart.
167
 There is documented 
evidence that subcontracting contracts for Walmart orders came to Tazreen Fashions 
and Tuba group through different Walmart suppliers, including IT Apparel in Dhaka 
(an agent used by one of Walmart’s former suppliers
168
), Success Apparel in New 
York through Nimmi Apparels in Dhaka (belonging to Simco Group), and Topson 
Downs in Culver City, Canada) to Bismallah Sourcing in Dhaka.169 
 
Li & Fung 
On 25 November, a day after the fire, Tazreen’s owner said it was producing for Li & 
Fung, among other brands. Li & Fung, a Hong Kong based international trading group 
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that supplies many international brands with garments, confirmed with CNN that it 
had placed orders worth more than USD 100,000 with the Tazreen factory in 2012.
170
  
 
KiK 
The German discounter KIK sourced from Tazreen earlier in 2012. KIK confirmed 
placing orders until November 2011, and stated that they did not source any 
garments from Tuba Group since August 2012.
171
 
 
Disney 
After several boxes of sweatshirts with Disney characters were found at the Tazreen 
factory
172
, Disney released a press statement that Tazreen “was not an authorized 
supplier for Disney-branded product”.
173
 Disney explained that Walmart obtained the 
rights to use Disney characters on some apparel product[s]. These products were not 
made in Tazreen Fashions.  They were made in a different factory, belonging to the 
Tuba Group, and according to Disney only a small quantity of products were moved to 
Tazreen Fashions for storage purposes.
174
 
 
Sears 
Documents found in the factory showed the company was producing for Sears. Like 
Walmart, Sears said that another supplier had subcontracted Sear’s production to 
Tazreen without authorisation. Sears said it had been working with Tazreen in the 
past but that it had ended the relationship.
175
 In response to a draft version of this 
report, Sears wrote to SOMO and CCC that “the merchandise found at Tazreen was 
not produced there with our knowledge”. And: “our policies require vendors to register 
with us all factories producing our goods, including any goods subcontracted to 
another production facility.  We rely on our vendors to follow policy, and provide us 
accurate and timely production information.  These requirements were not followed in 
this case, and as a result, Sears terminated the vendor”.
176
    
 
                                                     
170
 CNN, ”Retailers and suppliers hit by fallout from deadly Bangladesh factory fire”, 27 November 2012 
<http://edition.cnn.com/2012/11/27/world/asia/bangladesh-fire-mourning/index.html>  
171
 CCC  Urgent Appeals database 
172
  USA Today, “Wal-Mart, Disney, Sears used Bangladesh factory in fire”, 28 November 2012 
<http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/world/2012/11/28/bangladesh-fire-walmart-disney-
sears/1731225/> 
173
  The Walt Disney Company website,”Update Regarding Bangladesh” , 21 December 2012 
<http://thewaltdisneycompany.com/content/update-regarding-bangladesh>  
174
 Disney, correspondence with SOMO and CCC, 19 February 2013. 
175
 The New York Times, “Documents Indicate Walmart Blocked Safety Push in Bangladesh”, 5 December 
2012 <http://www.nytimes.com/2012/12/06/world/asia/3-walmart-suppliers-made-goods-in-bangladeshi-
factory-where-112-died-in-fire.html?_r=0> 
176
  Sears, email correspondence with SOMO and CCC, 26 February 2013. 
 47 
ENYCE 
Among the labels found in the burned-down factory were labels carrying the ENYCE 
logo. ENYCE is a brand owned by US rapper and producer Sean Combs. ENYCE 
clothing was sourced from Tazreen through Li & Fung. The president of ENYCE, 
Jeffrey Tweedy confirmed that ENYCE Kids is licensed to Li & Fung, "which operates, 
produces and oversees all manufacturing for the brand." He added that “compliance 
and safety are important to us, we expect all our licensees to have in place compliant 
standards for fire and safety conditions at any factory that may produce our brand."
177
 
 
Edinburgh Woollen Mills 
Sweaters from the Scottish label Edinburgh Woollen Mills were found in the factory 
after the fire, by labour activists and reporters.178 EWM was cited in the media 
confirming that they were sourcing from Tuba Group, the company which owns the 
Tazreen factory.
179
 
 
Dickies 
Garments for US brand Dickies were found in the factory after the fire. Despite 
Dickies’ garments being found in the burned-down factory, holding company 
Williamson-Dickie Manufacturing Co. stated that it had cut ties with Tazreen before 
the fire. The company declined to say when exactly it stopped production at Tazreen 
and for what reasons.
180
   
 
Piazza Italia 
After labels were found carrying the Piazza Italia logo, the company stated they buy 
only through trading companies and that they had no production at the factory. 
According to Piazza Italia, at the time of the fire Tazreen was working on Piazza Italia 
sample products.
181
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Hipercor (subsidiary of El Corte Ingles) 
In a reaction to a draft version of this report, El Corte Ingles wrote that its subsidiary 
Hipercor had a business relationship with Dhaka based vendor Texebo International. 
Texebo had subcontracted Hipercor production to the Tuba Group between April 
2011 and June 2012. The Tuba Group placed Hipercor production at Tazreen. The 
company further writes that “in June 2012 this indirect link to Tuba Group is definitely 
stopped due to quality and workmanship problems.” 
 
Karl Rieker 
A packing list of products for the German clothing brand Karl Rieker was found in the 
factory.
182
 To date, the company has not issued any public statement regarding the 
fire at Tazreen and its relationship with the manufacturer. In communication with 
SOMO and CCC, Karl Rieker confirmed that an order they placed with Tuba Group in 
the beginning of 2012 was produced by Tazreen Fashions, but without their prior 
knowledge.183 The company stated this was their first order with the Tuba Group and 
that they stopped working with the Tuba Group because they “had a lot of problems 
with Tuba”. The company did not further explain what these problems entailed.184 The 
last shipment of goods for Karl Rieker dated May 2012, according to Karl Rieker.
185
  
 
Delta Apparel (parent company of Soffe) 
Activists in Bangladesh told ABC News that they found order forms and design 
specifications for sweatshirts and tank tops with U.S. Marine Corps insignia and 
logos. Both the U.S. Marine Corps and the North Carolina-based company that was 
making items under a licensing agreement with the Marines (Soffe, subsidiary of 
Delta Apparel) said they did not know about or approve of any arrangement to make 
garments there.  Bob Humphreys, Chairman and CEO of Delta Apparel, said that his 
company had placed an order with Tazreen's parent company, Tuba Limited in 2011. 
When Soffe received a shipment of 11,000 garments from Tazreen at that time, Soffe 
officials complained to Tuba. "We told them no other garments could be made in that 
facility, it was not authorised," Humphreys said.
186 
In communication with the Worker 
Rights Consortium, Delta Apparel confirmed that there had been unauthorised 
production at Tazreen in 2011. Audits had been completed by Intertek in April and 
May 2011 at the Tuba Garment Ltd factory. Improvements were required with regard 
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to health and safety, and according to Delta Apparel all requirements were met by 30 
May 2011. No audits were carried out at Tazreen Fashions.187
   
 
Teddy Smith  
Sweaters from the French company Teddy Smith were among the clothing items that 
were found in the factory after the fire.
188
 To date, the company has not issued any 
public statement regarding the fire at Tazreen and its relationship with the 
manufacturer. However, Teddy Smith declared to France24 that it was not aware that 
their orders had been subcontracted to Tazreen Fashions. After the fire, Teddy Smith 
contacted its agent in Bangladesh, which acknowledged that production had been 
moved to Tazreen Fashions before the summer of 2012.189   
4.4. Social auditing 
Walmart 
Walmart’s Standards for Suppliers provide the framework for its audits.  Factories 
supplying Walmart are marked green, yellow, orange or red, based on the type and 
severity of violations found.
 190
 The Tazreen factory was audited at least twice by 
Walmart in 2011.
191
  
 
Documents on the Tuba Group website reveal that Walmart performed an audit at 
Tazreen on 16 May 2011. Tazreen received an orange rating after this audit. A letter 
from Walmart that is placed on the Tuba Group website refers to the audits and 
mentions that “the factory had violations and/or conditions which were deemed to be 
high risk.” The letter further mentions that this is the first orange assessment for this 
factory in a two year period. The factory is requested to draw up and complete an 
action plan which should be presented to the auditor during a follow-up audit that will 
take place within six months.
 192 
What eventually led Walmart to decide to discontinue 
its relationship with Tazreen (see paragraph 4.3) is not clear. 
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C&A 
In an interview with the Dutch newspaper De Telegraaf, Philip Chamberlain, Head of 
Sustainable Business Development at C&A said that the company’s own inspection 
did not give any reason not to start production at Tazreen.
193
 This inspection was 
carried out by C&A’s local sourcing office and included a “visual health and safety 
check”. The SOCAM (Service Office Compliance Audit Management) audit, which is 
much more comprehensive, had not been conducted at that time.
194
 
 
Business Social Compliance Initiative (BSCI) 
Tazreen Fashions had also been subjected to a BSCI audit in December 2011.The 
audit was carried out because a BSCI member considered sourcing from Tazreen. 
The audit revealed several non-compliances, among them health and safety issues. 
The factory was rated ‘improvement needed’.
195
 BSCI stated that corrective measures 
were due to be in place in December 2012. However, “as no BSCI participating 
company was and is currently sourcing from this factory, no participant had a 
relationship that would give the leverage and the responsibility to request 
improvement measures to be implemented in the factory. The factory is what we 
called an ‘orphan’, until Wednesday 21 November when another BSCI Participant 
decided to consider them for future business.”
196
 
 
BSCI criticized C&A for not identifying the above mentioned non-compliances. C&A’s 
Head of Sustainable Business Development, Philip Chamberlain responded that C&A 
did not know about the results of the BSCI audit as the report had not been made 
public.
197
  
4.5. Actions undertaken after the fire 
Civil society organisations 
Directly after the fire, labour rights organisations and unions went to the factory site to 
collect information about the fire, the victims and the brands sourcing from the factory. 
In the subsequent days press conferences and rallies were organised by trade union 
federations and other organisations, including the National Garment Workers 
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Federation, the Bangladesh Garment and Industrial Workers Federation and the 
Bangladesh National Council of Textile, Garment and Leather Workers198. 
 
ASK, Bangladesh Legal Aid Services Trust (BLAST), BRAC and Nijera Kori filed a 
Public Interest Litigation (writ petition), which was accepted by the High Court, 
ordering amongst others  that the Bangladesh Garment Manufacturers and Exporters 
Association (BGMEA), and the government should explain their preventive measures 
to save workers from fires. It also raised issues such as enforcement of relevant laws; 
compensation from the owners of Tuba Group and Tazreen Fashions and treatment 
of the injured workers; and an independent probe committee into this incident.199 On 
the 4 December 2012, Bangladeshi trade unions and international organisations 
published a set of demands to brands sourcing from Tazreen Fashions200 (see box 3).  
 
Box 3: Demands towards brands sourcing from Tazreen Fashions 
 
Bangladesh trade unions and international organisations published a set of demands to 
brands sourcing from Tazreen Fashions on 4 December 2012. These called for a 
delegation to be sent to Bangladesh to meet victims and their families, trade unions and 
labour rights organisations and work with other buyers to ensure the following demands 
are met: 
 
Full redress for the victims:  
 Emergency relief for all victims and their families;  
 Coverage of all medical costs short and long term;  
 Full and fair compensation covering loss of future earnings as well as damages for the 
injured and families of the dead, based on the compensation formula proposed by the 
unions and labour rights groups supporting the Bangladesh Fire and Building Safety 
Agreement. The full compensation package should also cover educational fees for the 
children of the deceased. 
 Ensure wages continue to be paid for all workers (meeting legal entitlements at 
minimum) and that all workers are rehired at Tazreen Fashions, or in the event that it 
does not reopen, that workers are paid legal severance and offered priority hiring in 
nearby suppliers at equivalent or higher salary levels.  
 Work with the government to set up a permanent workers’ welfare fund to cover 
compensation for industrial incidents and workplace injuries. 
 
Full and transparent investigation:  
 Acknowledge responsibility and support an independent investigation into the fires and 
prosecution for those culpable;  
 Publish all audit reports relating to Tazreen Fashions. 
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Prevention of future incidents:  
 Sign and immediately implement the comprehensive and independent Bangladesh 
Fire and Building Safety Agreement that has been developed by local and global 
unions and labour rights organisations. The programme includes independent 
inspections, public reporting, mandatory repairs and renovations, a central role for 
workers and unions in both oversight and implementation, supplier contracts with 
sufficient financing and adequate pricing, and a binding contract to make these 
commitments enforceable; 
 Publicly disclose full supplier list;  
 Actively promote freedom of association and bargaining rights for workers through 
access agreements to create an atmosphere where workers can freely join trade 
unions and form factory level unions. 
 
After individual follow up with the brands by CCC, the International Labour Rights 
Forum, Workers Rights Consortium and Maquila Solidarity Network, public actions 
have been launched to support the demands formulated by the groups.201 
 
On 17 January 2013, the European Parliament adopted a resolution on factory fires, 
in which the parliament welcomes the CCC-proposed Bangladesh Fire and Building 
Safety Agreement, calls upon textile brands to support this effort and to contribute to 
compensation for the victims of garment factory fires and their families.202  
4.6. Actions undertaken by buyers 
C&A 
In the days after the fire, C&A’s Head of Sustainable Business Development, Philip 
Chamberlain, traveled to Bangladesh for a three-day visit. After his return, C&A 
issued a press release (dated 6 December 2012) in which it announced that they 
would reserve 5 million euros for compensation, monitoring and prevention.
203
 
However, no details were provided about how much money would go to the victims, 
or would be spent on its own monitoring process, or preventive measures. 
 
The press release stated that C&A would work together with Caritas and other local 
organisations to “sponsor” housing and education for children who have lost their 
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parents in the fire. C&A also announced that it would implement a more stringent 
audit procedure. Future orders from Bangladesh must be preceded by a SOCAM 
audit (in addition to the initial Safety and Quality Assurance audit). The press release 
further specified that all C&A suppliers in Bangladesh will be subjected to SOCAM 
audits before the end of 2012. 
 
C&A issued another press release on 26 February 2013 in which further details about 
its response to the Tazreen fire were given. 
 Financial support for victims: C&A will donate more than one million USD  to 
the victims of the fire via the C&A Foundation. Recipients of financial support 
are: children who lost a parent at the fire; those injured and unable as yet to 
return to work and; families who lost a relative in the fire. 
C&A writes that 70 children from 46 families have been named as having lost 
at least one parent in the fire. An amount of USD 50 (4000 Taka) per month 
will be made available for each of these children until they reach the age of 
18 years old.  C&A further writes that 50 former employees of Tazreen 
fashions who were injured in the fire and are still unable to work will be 
supported by C&A. C&A will continue to pay the medical costs for each of 
these 50 people until such time as they are fully recovered and able to work. 
In addition C&A will pay for loss of earnings which this group has suffered. 
 For each of the families who lost a relative in the fire C&A has donated 1,200 
USD (BDT 100,000) per family.
204
 The distribution of this lump sum will be 
coordinated with the BGMEA. 
 Bangladesh Fire and Building Safety Agreement: C&A writes in its press 
release that it will “re-examine a possible accession to the treaty.” C&A 
company representatives referred to the lack of willingness among other 
companies to agree to a respective memorandum of understanding, which 
would render practical implementation difficult. “Few brands cannot effect the 
necessary change in regard to fire safety which is required in Bangladesh,” 
Mr. Chamberlain said. “To ensure safe and healthy working conditions in the 
future it is essential that initiatives are developed which involve multiple 
stakeholders, and will lead to fundamental change on the ground.”205 
 
By the end of February 2013, C&A reported to SOMO and CCC that all units used for 
C&A production in Bangladesh that had not yet been subjected to a SOCAM audit (as 
was the case with Tazreen) were now all audited by SOCAM and that future orders 
(not just those from Bangladesh but from all countries in which C&A production takes 
place) must be preceded by a SOCAM audit. 
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C&A added that one month before the fire it had started a fire prevention programme 
in Bangladesh. Implementation of this programme, which will be carried out in 
cooperation with Bureau Veritas, will be prioritised.
206
 
 
Li & Fung 
The company announced that it will carry out its own investigation into the incident at 
Tazreen. The company issued a statement on the incident in which it says that “we 
will continue to work with the authorities and the business community in Bangladesh 
to ensure that proper support is given”.
207
  
 
The company further promised to intensify it training program for garment factories 
worldwide.
208
 The programme includes ”Enabling Fire Safety, Fire Safety Videos, Fire 
Safety Management, Videos on Best Practices and Capacity  Building”.  
 
In response to a draft version of this report, Li & Fung wrote that it has provided BDT 
100,000 (USD 1,250) compensation to 54 injured workers and to 57 families of 
deceased workers. They have not provided further detail about the identification and 
disbursal of the compensation. As stated above, the BGMEA announced it was in 
charge of distributing compensation on behalf of Li&Fung, which was provided for at 
most 53 deceased workers by the date of 20 February 2013.  
 
In addition, Li & Fung reported to SOMO and CCC that, in collaboration with another 
retailer, they have set up an educational fund for children of deceased and injured. An 
amount of 4000 Taka (US$50) per month will be made available for each of these 
children until they reach the age of 18 years old.
209
 
 
Walmart 
Four days after the Tazreen incident, Walmart sent a proposal to members of the 
Global Social Compliance Programme. This industry group represents more than 30 
companies, including Walmart, Carrefour and PVH Corp. The three-page proposal 
said “fire and electrical safety aspects are not currently adequately covered in audits,” 
and outlined steps “to significantly improve fire safety precautions on all fronts.” 
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Among the steps: members of the group would pay to review all factories, which 
would be given six months to “implement corrective action at supplier cost.”
 210 
In April 2011, Walmart participated in a meeting in Bangladesh with global retailers to 
discuss how Bangladesh factories can improve their electrical and fire safety. On the 
basis of the minutes of this meeting  the New York Times wrote that, a Walmart 
director of ethical sourcing, along with an official from another major apparel retailer, 
said that the proposed improvements in electrical and fire safety would involve as 
many as 4,500 factories and would be “in most cases” a “very extensive and costly 
modification. It is not financially feasible for the brands to make such investments”.
211
 
In a reaction to the draft report Walmart wrote that the remarks from the meeting in 
Bangladesh in April 2011 had been taken out of context and remarked that Walmart 
recognises “the cost of meeting standards [for suppliers] will be part of the cost of the 
goods we buy.”
212
 
 
In December 2012, CCC published an overview of actions undertaken by brands in 
reaction to the fire. CCC then warned there was no indication that the programme 
announced by Walmart will pay for the renovations that are needed, or that it will 
respond to any of the other key elements of a credible prevention programme.
 213 
 
A month later, on 22 January 2013, Walmart sent a letter to all its suppliers to inform 
them of “a new zero-tolerance policy for unauthorized subcontracting, as well as 
related ethical sourcing program enhancements”. In this letter Walmart writes that 
“any facilities subcontracting sourcing of Walmart merchandise to an undisclosed or 
unauthorized facility will be classified as “Red-Failed” in our system and may be 
permanently barred from sourcing merchandise to Walmart for all retail markets.” In 
addition, the letter states that facilities (worldwide) found to have fire safety related 
violations will have 30 days in which to take corrective action before production is 
barred. Walmart further announces a number of measures specific for suppliers in 
Bangladesh: 
 Suppliers in Bangladesh will be reviewed. Corrective action for any fire safety 
issues identified will be required within 30 days.  
 All facilities must go through a mandatory electrical and building safety review
provided by a credible independent external certification agency.    
 Production may not begin until after the facility has passed the full Ethical 
Sourcing pre-qualification process. Production in a facility that has not been 
prequalified will be deemed unauthorised subcontracting.  
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 Facilities that meet one or more of the “Structural Fire Safety Criteria” (see 
below) will be assessed as “Red-Unauthorized” and inactivated.   
  
Structural Fire Safety Criteria to be Deemed High Risk:   
 Residential building converted into factory  
 Facilities in multi-storey building with a ground-floor marketplace  
 Facilities in multi-storey building shared with other factories/enterprises under 
separate ownership  
 Facilities with a rooftop that does not meet legal requirements  
 Facilities where there is a residence located within the building  
 
El Corte Ingles 
In response to a draft version of this report, El Corte Ingles writes that it has actively 
supported the proposed Fire Safety Alliance, a joint initiative with GIZ, the German 
technical cooperation Agency. This Alliance aims to implement a broad action 
programme in both Bangladesh and Pakistan involving all stakeholders, including 
CCC, IndustriALL, ILO, brands and retailers and all the players – Government, unions 
and businesses- at local level in both countries.  El Corte Ingles further writes that as 
soon as the Alliance and the programme will be agreed upon, they plan to commit, 
also financially, to its development.  
 
In a letter to GSCP (Global Social Compliance Programme), convener of the 
proposed Fire Safety Alliance, CCC together with other international labour groups 
outlined their objections to a programme that would not be based on the criteria of 
transparency, independent inspections, worker involvement, multi-stakeholder 
overview, mandatory reparations, financial support and pricing that allows for 
renovations and binding arbitration. These are the core criteria of the Bangladesh Fire 
and Building Safety Agreement (BFBSA), and elaborated in detail in this Agreement. 
The labour groups deplored any delay that might occur by introducing yet another 
programme to the signing of the BFBSA by brands sourcing from Bangladesh, given 
the urgency of fire safety issues in the Bangladesh garment industry, and  that the 
BFBSA had been shared with brands already well in advance of this new initiative 
(including with El Corte Ingles).  
 
Other buyers 
The other buyers have not communicated about any concrete action or program they 
had developed to prevent future fire and building accidents in Bangladesh, or to pay 
compensation of the victims of the fire at Tazreen Fashions. EWM failed to respond in 
any way to the demands from the trade unions and labour groups.214 In 
correspondence with Maquila Solidarity Network and the International Labor Rights 
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Fund, Disney has refused to commit to the Fire and Bangladesh Safety Building 
Agreement, as they “do not believe that it is a workable framework”. Disney adds to 
have been in further conversations with the US government and other stakeholders to 
develop a collaborative and long-term approach that would make more sense for 
them, and refers to developments between the ILO and Bangladesh government 
regarding a new National Tripartite Action Plan on Fire Safety, without, however, 
giving any details or timeframe. 215 
 
BSCI 
In response to SOMO and CCC’s review request, BSCI wrote that it had undertaken 
initiatives with regard to system issues, capacity building and awareness raising and 
stakeholder relations
.216
 
 
From now on, BSCI stated, fire safety issues will render audits ‘non-compliant’ in all 
cases. Fire safety non-compliances require fast actions and thus the corrective 
actions are to be checked in such case. All audit materials and tools regarding fire 
safety in the BSCI Platform will be reworked. 
 
A special alert system is installed which will alert BSCI participants when fire safety 
violations are detected at their suppliers. A special check list for buyers is distributed, 
focusing on health and safety issues and on fire safety in particular.  
 
In February 2013 a pilot ‘fire preparedness training’ for factories in Bangladesh was 
conducted in cooperation with WRAP. In addition, training for buying companies was 
organised in Germany.  
 
Lastly, BSCI informed SOMO and CCC that they will organise a Round Table about 
fire safety in Bangladesh on 14 March 2013. 
4.7. Compensation 
Based on international labour standards (including ILO convention 121) and best 
practices
217
 in Bangladesh, the Bangladesh unions have demanded BDT 500,000 
(USD 6,337) compensation for pain and suffering for the injured workers and families 
of the deceased workers. In addition to the compensation for pain and suffering, BDT 
2,1 million (USD 26,617) compensation should be paid for loss of income for each of 
the deceased workers, as well as 10% of this amount for education of any children. 
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Injured workers should receive compensation for loss of income as long as they 
would be unable to work.  
 
As of February 20, 2013, only 49 families of 53 deceased workers have received 
compensation disbursed by the BGMEA. Only for 43 deceased workers BDT. 
600,000 (USD 7,605) was distributed to their families. For 10 workers there was 
partial compensation, and for 9 more identified workers that have been listed by the 
authorities no compensation has yet been paid. The amount is provided by the 
government (BDT 300,000, USD 3,802), BGMEA (BDT 100.000, USD 1,267), the 
Bankers Association (BDT 100,000) and Li& Fung (BDT 100.000).
218
 In addition, by 
the end of January 2013, 33 of the injured workers are confirmed to have received 
BDT100,000 from the BGMEA.219 
4.8. Conclusions 
This case shows how multiple actors – government, manufacturers, buyers and 
auditing firms – failed to assume their responsibility in protecting and respecting 
workers’ rights. Hazardous conditions eventually culminated in the horrific fire that 
swept through the factory on 24 November 2012, killing 112 workers and injuring 
dozens of others.  
 
Failure to prevent the fire 
As at Ali Enterprises in Pakistan, the management of Tazreen Fashions neglected its 
responsibility to protect workers’ rights. The management failed to provide its workers 
with safe working conditions. Equally, the government of Bangladesh neglected its 
duty to protect the rights of the Tazreen workers. A number of government bodies 
failed in their task to ensure a safe working environment. The Bangladesh labour 
inspectorate, for instance, is dramatically understaffed and highly ineffective. Tazreen 
Fashions had operations running at all floors of a nine-storey building, while having 
permission for production activities at three floors only. The labour inspection did not 
prevent this. Although Tazreen Fashions got clearance from the Fire Service and Civil 
Defence, no inspector ever visited the factory.  
 
Some of the buyers sourcing at Tazreen Fashions, such as Walmart, detected safety 
risks at Tazreen Fashions prior to the November 2012 fire. Equally some of the 
auditing firms that looked into conditions at Tazreen such as BSCI found non-
compliances. Buyers and auditors did, nevertheless, not take appropriate action to 
remediate the safety hazards. Nobody was notified about the safety hazards, 
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although all major buyers from Bangladesh have been warned again and again about 
the imminent dangers in the garment factories.
220
 In fact, the buyers and auditors left 
workers literally in a death-trap, as was proven reality on November 24, 2012. The 
confidentiality of audit reports and supplier-lists seems to prevail above the possibility 
to save human lives. Other buyers and their respective auditors (e.g. C&A) seem to 
have completely overlooked any fire safety issues. It is unclear how some of visible 
deficits, such as the absence of emergency exits and automated fire defense 
systems, could have been missed by the auditors.  
 
After the fire, several buying companies and business associations, such as BSCI, 
committed to undertake actions to prevent future tragedies from occurring. They are 
increasing the number of audits and invest in fire safety trainings. However, most of 
these actions fail to address the structural problems that allow for tragedies like these 
to happen. Many factory building were built for other purposes and, unless serious 
renovations take place, are not fit for garment production. To renovate these 
buildings, buyers should commit to financial support and pricing that makes 
renovations feasible. In order for the manufacturer to also invest in renovations, 
buyers should commit to long term relationships. In case orders will be ceased 
because of notorious non-compliance with safety standards, buyers should commit to 
ensuring it is not the workers who pay the price. This includes commitment that 
workers are paid legally required severance payments and back wages, negotiations 
with worker representatives for additional provisions to mitigate losses, and offering of 
alternative employment. 
 
In addition, there is no transparent multi-stakeholder process that includes a provision 
for binding arbitration, to ensure adequate implementation of such improvement 
programmes.  
 
Local civil society organisations were able to identify a considerable number of buyers 
that were sourcing at Tazreen at the time of the fire. Quite a number of these buyers, 
however, (e.g. Walmart, Sears and Hipercor) have not acknowledged Tazreen 
Fashions as their authorised supplier. On the contrary, they have indicated that their 
suppliers must have subcontracted production to Tazreen without their knowledge. 
The Tazreen Fashions fire case demonstrates how important it is that brands and 
retailers conduct human rights due diligence throughout their supply chains. This 
enables them to identify where their production is taking place, what the human rights 
risks are so that they can take measures to ensure workers’ rights are respected 
throughout their supply chain. In addition, it shows the importance of disclosure of 
supplier lists, being the only way that workers and their organisations can check 
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whether their factories are on the radar of the global brands. Given the requirement to 
companies to ensure access to redress, this transparency is crucial.  
 
Failure to provide full redress to victims 
Compensation of victims has been hampered by the fact that not all workers 
employed at Tazreen Fashions received an employment contract. This situation 
severely hampered the swift identification of the victims and the injured. The 
government of Bangladesh has paid compensation in line with the demands of labour 
groups. However, to date not all workers or their families received the compensation 
they are entitled to. Corporate action with regard to compensation is still far from 
adequate. So far only C&A en Li & Fung have taken some steps towards payment of 
medical costs and covering the loss of income of injured workers. However, their joint 
contribution only amounts to 8% of the total amount of the compensation demanded 
for the deceased workers. Neither company has agreed to a calculation of 
compensation based on loss of income, an internationally recognised basis for 
compensation in case of occupational accidents and diseases.
221
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5. Conclusions  
All workers have the right to work in an environment that is safe and not detrimental 
to their health. This right is laid down in Article 7 of the International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights which is part of the International Bill of Human 
Rights, as well as being enshrined in ILO Convention 155. It is clear that this right has 
been breached in both cases featured in this report, and that multiple actors are to be 
held responsible. These actors also have a responsibility in remediating the harm 
caused for victims and avoiding future tragedies. 
 
The UN Guiding Principles have effectively clarified that companies have a 
responsibility to respect human rights, independent of the state duty to protect human 
rights. They outline measures to be undertaken by business and government to 
prevent abuses from occurring, and to remedy the abuses that, notwithstanding 
preventive measures, have occurred. In this concluding chapter, the UN Guiding 
Principles are applied to formulate what actions each of the actors involved in the 
fires at the factories of Ali Enterprise in Karachi, Pakistan and Tazreen Fashions in 
Dhaka, Bangladesh would need to take to adequately protect and respect the rights 
of workers in Bangladesh and Pakistan to a safe workplace (that is: prevention), and 
provide for remedy in cases such as those presented in this report, where workers 
suffer injury or death as a result of a safety incident. 
5.1. Duty to Protect: governments of garment-producing 
countries 
As the cases of Tazreen and Ali Enterprise have demonstrated, the governments of 
both Bangladesh and Pakistan failed to protect the garment workers from the violation 
of their rights to safe workplaces. The relevant inspectorates in both countries (e.g 
labour, building, planning, and electricity inspectorate) are insufficiently equipped to 
enforce occupational health and safety laws. 
 
In addition, both governments have failed to ensure access to effective remedy for the 
victims of the fires and their relatives. Highly problematic is the lack of institutionalised 
compensation schemes in both countries222, as recommended in ILO Convention 121.  
 
To address these gaps in the protection of garment workers and to ensure access to 
remedy, governments of garment producing countries should at the minimum:  
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 Ensure an effective labour inspectorate, which implies it is transparent and 
equipped with the necessary resources to conduct regular inspections for 
adherence to workplace safety and labour legislation; reinforcement 
measures and sufficient capacity. This demand is supported by a recent 
resolution of the European Parliament in which it “Calls on the Governments 
of Bangladesh and Pakistan to continue with thorough investigations into the 
recent events and to put in place measures to prevent a recurrence of the 
tragedies, including full compliance by all manufacturers with health and 
safety legislation (notably the Labour Act (2006) in Bangladesh) and the 
establishment of an effective and independent system of labour inspections 
and inspections of industrial buildings”223 
 Conduct independent investigations into criminal negligence of the 
management of concerned factories;  
 Set up, or ensure the setting up of an institutionalised compensation scheme 
in line with ILO Convention 121;  
 Ensure respect for workers’ internationally recognised rights of freedom of 
association and collective bargaining by ratifying and implementing ILO 
conventions on freedom of association, and actively promoting freedom of 
association.  
 
Box 4: Minimum requirements for safe factories 
 
Inspections must ensure that each factory at a minimum meets national and other 
international standards for fire prevention and emergency evacuation plans. Listed below 
are some key standards that should be met, but this is by no means a complete or 
exhaustive list: 
 
 Every production facility floor must have sufficient number of emergency exits, and at 
minimum two exits at opposite ends of the building that are accessed by unique exit 
routes.  
 All exterior doors and doors to exit hallways and staircases must open in the direction 
of travel and be readily opened by any worker without the use of keys or tools. 
 Barred windows must be readily opened from the inside without the use of keys or 
tools.  
 In multi-storey buildings, exit stairways must be isolated from the building by one-hour 
fire-rated walls and doors. The doors must be self-closing and kept closed at all times. 
 The maximum distance to an exit in an apparel factory cannot exceed 200 feet (61 
meters) if the building is unsprinklered or 250 feet (76 meters) if provided with 
automatic fire sprinklers. Exit routes are direct, without the need to go from one 
production area to another to reach an exit.  
 The full width of aisles, exits and staircases must be kept clear of storage and other 
obstructions at all times.  
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 Exit routes must be provided with emergency lighting and be marked with signs that 
are easily seen from all areas within the facility.  
 Warehouses and other areas where combustible or flammable materials are stored 
cannot be located on or beneath working factory floors unless they are fully 
sprinklered and provided with a minimum of one hour fire-rated separation from work 
areas.  
 The building meets regulations for gas lines and electrical wiring, fire retardant 
materials in walls and roofs. 
 Procedures for safe use of the machinery being operated are available and observed, 
 Smoking within any area of the building is not allowed under any circumstances.  
 Every work area is provided with an audible and visual alarm system to alert workers 
of an emergency. Alarm buttons are located at every exit door.  
 The factory has well-maintained fire prevention materials and fire fighting equipment 
on the premises.  
 The factory has a professionally-developed fire emergency policy, which is tested 
through regular, monthly fire drills with all workers. 
 Fire awareness and prevention training is provided for all workers at the time of hire 
and annually thereafter—in conjunction with fire drills.   
 Fire drills are conducted for all factory areas and work shifts at least every six months.  
 A designated manager is responsible for structural and fire safety, and an adequate 
number of employees who are trained to respond appropriately to fires and other 
emergency situations. 
 The factory is inspected by a trained fire safety team during each work shift to ensure 
that these requirements are met at all times.  
 The factory has a health and safety committee comprised of representatives of 
management and workers, which meets regularly to review and address health and 
safety issues, including fire safety.  
 In the case of factories operating in buildings housing more than one enterprise, in 
addition to the measures outlined above, has a coordinated fire emergency policy and 
procedures, accessible fire fighting equipment, designated and trained personnel, and 
a programme of regular fire drills for the entire building. 
5.2. Duty to protect: governments at buying end of the 
supply chain 
Alongside governments in garment-producing countries, the governments of 
countries with buying companies domiciled in their territory/jurisdiction also have a 
role to play in the protection of garment workers in Pakistan and Bangladesh, as well 
as ensuring workers’ access to remedy in case of violations. The UN Guiding 
Principles stipulate that governments should “set out clearly the expectation that all 
business enterprises domiciled in their territory/jurisdiction respect human rights 
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throughout their operations”224, which includes supply chains. To make sure this 
expectation is indeed effectuated, CCC and SOMO argue that governments at the 
buying end of the supply chain should: 
 Take measures to ensure that companies domiciled in their 
territory/jurisdiction respect human rights throughout their supply chains. 
 Support fire and building safety programmes in Bangladesh and Pakistan that 
adhere to the principles of transparency, accountability, independent 
inspections, mandatory renovations and worker involvement.   
 Introduce legislation that holds companies domiciled in their 
territory/jurisdiction accountable for human rights violations throughout their 
supply chains. 
 Make private-public investments in garment industry in Bangladesh and 
Pakistan and other forms of government support to corporations conditional 
on implementation of safety programmes according to internationally agreed-
upon labour standards.
225
  
 Use their bilateral, multilateral and diplomatic relations to motivate the 
governments of Bangladesh and Pakistan to fulfil their duty to ensure a safe 
working environment in the garment industry, protect the rights of their 
garment workers and ensure access to remedy, including compensation. 
5.3. Corporate responsibility to respect: garment brand 
companies and retailers 
Apart from the governments of Bangladesh and Pakistan that failed to meet their duty 
to protect the rights of garment workers in their jurisdictions, the cases also 
demonstrate that garment brand companies and retailers failed to meet their 
responsibility to respect the rights of the garment workers. Corporate human rights 
due diligence procedures (if implemented at all) were not able to prevent the fires 
from happening and causing a high death toll, injuries and an atmosphere of fear 
amongst garment workers. In addition, adverse impacts have not been mitigated. The 
families of the victims, the injured, and the workers who are now jobless are still 
waiting for full compensation for loss of income in line with international standards. 
 
To date, most brands and retailers have failed to ensure adequate compensation for 
the victims of the factory fires at Ali Enterprises and Tazreen Fashions in line with 
international standards. Brands and retailers have failed to use their leverage towards 
other responsible actors (e.g. government, certification bodies, business associations, 
other buyers, etc.) to put in place a sustainable and structural redress mechanism in 
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the form of an institutionalised compensation scheme. SOMO and CCC recognise 
that KIK has taken a good step in the right direction with the current compensation 
package and the signed commitment to negotiate further compensation with local and 
international labour groups. However, CCC and SOMO warn against further delay in 
the process. 
 
The cases of Ali Entreprises and Tazreen Fashions also demonstrate that current 
purchasing practices are not stimulating the upgrading of factory building to safety 
standards. It is clear that the hazardous conditions at the factories concerned did not 
materialise overnight. Instead, the structural insecurity of the buildings (illegal 
constructions, lack of safety exits, blocking and locking of exits) existed long before 
the fatal incidents took place. The failure of the buyers to fix these hazards (on their 
own initiative or in collaboration with others), or, when they had left the factory for 
safety reasons, the failure to inform relevant stakeholders, most notably the workers, 
makes them responsible. 
 
Therefore buyers and retailers should, at a minimum: 
 Install safety programmes that include the key elements in Box 5; 
 Disclose all audit reports of factories where safety incidents have taken place 
and/or where non-compliances with health and safety standards have been 
documented. 
 Implement better purchasing practices to enable and encourage 
improvements in occupational health and safety conditions at suppliers. For 
instance, buyers should offer adequate prices, multi-year contracts and 
reasonable supply lead times to enable upgrading of facilities by suppliers 
and increase their leverage.  
 Negotiate with organisations that represent the victims of the fires about 
adequate compensation, in situations where full compensation in line with ILO 
Convention 121 is not ensured by law and practice. 
 Contribute to and ensure full payment of compensation based on grief and 
loss of income, medical and psychological care, payment of wages (and in 
case the factory closes negotiate severance) and continuance of worker 
employment.  
 Be transparent and accountable with regard to these compensation efforts. 
 Spread responsibility for remedy over multiple companies, including 
companies that sourced from the factory in the period (one to two years) 
preceding the fires.   
 Use their leverage to motivate other stakeholders to protect/respect the rights 
of garment workers and, if these efforts fail, increase their leverage (for 
instance by joining forces with other parties involved).  
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Box 5: Key elements of an effective fire and building safety programme 
 
 Inspections by trained fire safety experts operating independently of the brands and 
the factories being inspected; 
 Public reporting of the results of all inspections; 
 Mandatory repairs and renovations to address all identified hazards – and a 
requirement that brands must cease doing business with any supplier that refuses to 
make needed repairs and operate safely; 
 A central role for workers and unions, including worker-led safety committees in all 
factories and access to factories for unions to educate workers on how they can 
protect their rights and their safety, including their right to refuse unsafe work; 
 Contracts with suppliers that ensure sufficient financing and adequate pricing to cover 
the cost of eliminating deadly hazards and operating in a safe manner; and 
 A binding contract between the brands and worker representatives that make these 
commitments enforceable – so the brands have to follow through, even if it means 
increased costs or longer turnaround times on orders. 
5.4. Corporate responsibility to respect: auditing firms and 
certification bodies 
In the cases of Ali Enterprises and Tazreen Fashions both suppliers and buyers 
heavily relied on auditing and certification to manage their due diligence obligations. 
In both cases, auditing firms and certification bodies provided undeserved and 
unjustifiable assurance that the mentioned factories complied with health and safety 
standards. Ali Enterprises had received an SA8000 certification for decent working 
conditions from the SAAS-accredited Italian auditor Registro Italiano Navale Group 
(RINA) only one month before the tragic fire. This case highlights the weaknesses of 
the SAI certification system to detect safety hazards and prevent adverse human 
rights impacts.  
 
At present, there are no serious consequences for audit firms and certification bodies 
when they provide false safety assurances. They are not held responsible for the fires 
and other serious health and safety accidents and fatalities. However, one can clearly 
argue that their business activity has contributed to the adverse human rights impact 
documented in the present cases, by inhibiting others (i.e. buyers, factory 
management, governments) to take adequate preventive action. As such, according 
to the UN Guiding Principles, they are also responsible for mitigating these impacts. 
The two cases have prompted fundamental criticism of the methodology of audit firms 
and certification bodies.  If SAI is to maintain any credibility it must seriously 
reconsider its auditing methods to address these fundamental shortcomings in the 
future, as well as cooperate with those groups working for justice for the victims of the 
Ali Enterprises fire. 
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Therefore, audit firms and certification bodies, at the minimum, should: 
 Notify the buyer, the government, relevant business associations and worker 
representatives when factory audits identify health and safety hazards, and 
publicly disclose the results of such audits. 
 When having failed to do the above, provide redress to affected workers and 
families of affected workers. The same responsibility applies in situations 
where auditing firms or certification bodies have failed to detect safety 
hazards in the course of an audit or certification process. In concrete terms 
this includes paying compensation to the families of workers who died in the 
fire and to injured workers.  
 Provide full transparency and disclosure of audit reports of Ali Enterprises 
and Tazreen Fashions to contribute to effective remedy for the families of the 
victims and the survivors.  In particular, disclose information about the buyers 
of Ali Enterprises to ensure that victims have access to redress from these 
companies. 
 Fundamentally alter their reliance on accredited quality control firms, 
commonly paid by the factory owner, who often lack safety expertise and are 
not trusted by workers and trade unions, rendering their worker interviews 
implausible.  
 Publish audit methodologies and reports of the factories inspected, and 
actively solicit engagement with worker representatives, trade unions and 
other labour rights organisations to ensure audits are part of a broader and 
on-going monitoring process.   
5.5. Corporate responsibility to respect: factory owners 
While buyers and auditors each have a responsibility to respect the rights of garment 
workers in their business relationships, factory owners, as employers, carry the 
primary responsibility to ensure safe working conditions for their employees. Each 
individual factory owner needs to take responsibility for ensuring the safety of his 
employees. In terms of redress and remedy for the victims of the reported fires, the 
first line of responsibility, under law and practice, is the direct employer of the workers 
affected, particularly when the injury has occurred as a result of negligence. In the 
presented cases deaths and injury were caused or exacerbated by illegal, unsafe 
building, faulty electrics or machinery, poor safety procedures and avoidable hazards 
such as blocked or inadequate fire exits. The current practice in Bangladesh is that 
buildings that are not fit for the purpose are turned into garment factories, often using 
illegal building constructions, to profit from the booming garment industry.  
 
Under different conditions, worker representatives could be expected to address this 
issue with factory management, but in both Pakistan and Bangladesh, factory owners 
generally refuse to allow trade unions into their factories. In countries with generally 
higher factory safety standards, experience proves that involvement of workers in 
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safety committees, the availability of complaint procedures and the freedom to refuse 
work under unsafe conditions, has contributed to improved safety.226 
 
Factory owners must ultimately be held accountable for their negligence in regard to 
the upholding of adequate safety standards in the workplaces they own and run. 
Simply expressing regret or in some cases, providing a minimal compensation to 
workers once an incident has occurred is not sufficient when it has been their 
decision to cut corners in regard to building safety, electrical and equipment 
maintenance that has put the lives of their own workers at risk. Furthermore, current 
management practices in the garment industries of Pakistan and Bangladesh inhibit 
victims’ access to remedy. As proper registration of workers is lacking, currently it is 
up to the victims to prove they are eligible for compensation.  
 
To prevent future tragedies and ensure remedy for the victims of the fire, garment 
factory owners in Bangladesh and Pakistan should, at a minimum: 
 Ensure expert assessments of factory safety, improve the buildings 
accordingly, and put safety first. 
 Change the present management attitude that leads to locking of gates, and 
keeping production speed at all times, thereby ignoring signs of approaching 
catastrophes. 
 Allow genuine workplace representation and recognise the role that trade 
unions and workplace safety committees can play in upholding safety 
standards for workers. 
 Contribute to and ensure full payment of compensation based on grief and 
loss of income, medical and psychological care, payment of wages (and in 
case factory closes negotiate severance) and continuance of worker 
employment.  
 Develop adequate worker registration systems.  
5.6. In conclusion 
The cases presented in this report are not single incidents but indicates structural 
hazardous working conditions in the garment sector in both Bangladesh and 
Pakistan. To illustrate, since the Tazreen fire on 24 November 2012, another 28 
factory fires have been reported in Bangladesh alone. This report demonstrates the 
urgent need for immediate and structural changes in the practices of government and 
business actors along the garment supply chain, in accordance with the 
internationally recognized State duty to protect human rights and the corporate 
responsibility to respect human rights.   
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Fatal Fashion 
Analysis of recent factory fires in Pakistan 
and Bangladesh: a call to protect and respect 
garment workers’ lives
This report describes two recent factory fires ravaging the facilities of clothing 
manufacturers in Pakistan and Bangladesh. In September 2012 a fire raged 
at Ali Enterprises in Karachi, in November 2012 a factory fire broke out at 
Tazreen Fashions Limited in Dhaka; two companies producing for well-known 
European and American clothing brands and retailers. Hundreds of workers 
were killed in horrendous circumstances, and many others were severely 
injured. Sub-standard buildings, poor emergency procedures, blocked fire 
exits, overcrowded workplaces, and vastly inadequate control and auditing 
practices resulted in an extremely high death toll. 
The two cases described in this report are symptomatic of an ailing system. 
They reflect systemic flaws on the level of government protection of human 
rights and a gross disrespect shown by the garment industry for workers’ 
rights. The garment industry in both Bangladesh and Pakistan is notorious 
for low wages, demanding and unsafe working conditions, and the repression 
of unions. Workers are not organised and therefore not in the position 
to monitor or report freely about safety hazards.
In Fatal Fashion the Centre for Research on Multinational Corporations 
(SOMO) and the Clean Clothes Campaign (CCC) clarify the duties and 
responsibilities of the different actors involved in the described cases 
– manufacturers, brands, retailers, audit firms, certification bodies, and 
governments. In addition, SOMO and CCC assess to which degree the 
duties and responsibilities of the different actors have been met.
The report demonstrates the urgent need for immediate and structural 
changes in the practices of government and business actors in the global 
garment industry, in accordance with the internationally recognised state 
duty to protect human rights and the corporate responsibility to respect 
human rights.  
